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Exorcizing Wechsler's Ghost: The Influence
of the Model Penal Code on Death Penalty
Sentencing Jurisprudence
by RUSSELL DEAN COVEY*
Introduction
The constitutional law of capital sentencing currently is torn
between its past and its future. It is built upon a utilitarian, offender-
based sentencing theory, but that theory looks increasingly inapposite
in the face of retributivism's resurgence as the dominant justification
for criminal punishment. Since Furman v. Georgia,' the Court's death
penalty rhetoric has reflected this resurgence, and has increasingly
embraced the language of retribution: Is the death penalty a morally
appropriate response to the defendant's acts?2 Does this defendant
deserve to die for this crime?3 However, the basic procedural and
jurisprudential structures - including the foundational principle of
"individual consideration," which directs the focus of the sentencing
* Associate Professor of Law, Whittier Law School. J.D., Yale Law School; M.A.,
Princeton University; A.B., Amherst College. I am grateful to David Treiman, Mary
Ellen Gale, Richard Gruner, Bill Patton, and Kevin Stack for their comments, suggestions,
and helpful criticisms in response to various earlier incarnations of this paper. I wish
especially to acknowledge Julia Fayngold Covey, who is, among many things, my best and
most patient editor.
1. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
2. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002) ("[T]he severity of the
appropriate punishment necessarily depends on the culpability of the offender."); Penry v.
Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 788 (2001) (noting that a capital sentence must reflect "a reasoned
moral response to the defendant's background, character, and crime") (quoting California
v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987)).
3. See, e.g., Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 666-67 (1987) (characterizing the death
penalty as a decision regarding "whether a man deserves to live or die") (quoting
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 521-22 n.20 (1968)); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782, 801 (1982) (noting that capital defendant's "punishment must be tailored to his
personal responsibility and moral guilt.").
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process primarily to the character of the offender rather than the
nature of the offense, the open-ended evidentiary rules that govern
sentencing processes, and the procedural devices by which that
unbounded evidence is evaluated - all originated as the offspring of
an explicitly non-retributive penal theory crafted in large part by
Herbert Wechsler and codified in the Model Penal Code ("MPC" or
"the Code").
The result is a disjuncture between purpose and practice, giving
rise to an analytical and moral vacuum at the center of contemporary
capital jurisprudence. Indeed, not only has the Court failed, with a
few critical exceptions, to identify the specific criteria by which
sentencers decide if a criminal defendant deserves to live or die,4 it
has affirmatively declared that territory off limits to the state.' As a
result, it has constructed a peculiar constitutional space in which only
the capital fact-finder may tread, and in so doing, it has with one hand
unraveled the fabric of "guided discretion" that it professedly has
sewn with the other.
The American Law Institute ("ALI" or "the Institute"), which
drafted the MPC in the late 1950s, and adopted it in the early 1960s,
4. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), established that the death penalty was not
a proportionate penalty for rape. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 782, as modified by Tison v.
Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987), established that the death penalty was not available in the
absence of a sufficiently culpable mental state - e.g., intent to kill or reckless indifference
to life. Most recently, Atkins, 536 U.S. at 304, established a prohibition on executions of
mentally retarded persons.
5. For instance, the Court has stated:
Nor may States channel the sentencer's consideration of this evidence by
defining the weight or significance it is to receive-for example, by making
evidence of mental retardation relevant only insofar as it bears on the question
whether the crime was committed deliberately. Rather, they must let the
sentencer 'give effect' to mitigating evidence in whatever manner it pleases. Nor,
when a jury is assigned the sentencing task, may the State attempt to impose
structural rationality on the sentencing decision by requiring that mitigating
circumstances be found unanimously; each juror must be allowed to determine
and 'give effect' to his perception of what evidence favors leniency, regardless of
whether those perceptions command the assent of (or are even comprehensible
to) other jurors.
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 663-64 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (citations
omitted).
6. See, e.g., Henry Weihofen, Retribution Is Obsolete, 39 NAT'L PROBATION &
PAROLE NEWS 1, 4 (1960) (discussing the merits of a rehabilitative stance regarding
punishment over a retributive stance). In the 1970s, retributive ideas began to be dusted
off as the star of rehabilitation waned. See Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal
Law: An Opinionated Review, 87 CAL. L. REv. 943, 979 (1999) ("Beginning in the early
1970s,. a widespread disaffection with rehabilitation as a theory and in practice took
hold...."); Michael Tonry, Sentencing Guidelines and the Model Penal Code, 19
RUTGERS L. J. 823, 824 (1988).
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itself recently embarked on a major revision to the sentencing
provisions of the Code that would return retributivism to its pride of
place as the predominant justification of criminal punishment.7
Although the ALI's Plan for Revision does not yet indicate what
direction the Institute might take with respect to the MPC's capital
sentencing provisions, the little-noticed disconnect8 between the
Supreme Court's predominantly retributive capital sentencing
philosophy and the non-retributive MPC-based procedures it has
sanctioned make revisions in this area especially important.
The Court's reliance on legal structures developed in service of a
utilitarian sentencing theory has caused mischief in two principal
respects. First, it has led to the development of a sentencing regime
in which individuals are selected to die not only because of what they
have done, but also, and perhaps primarily, because of who they are.
By permitting sentencing proceedings to focus on the character of the
offender, capital defendants are often sentenced to death even where
there was unrebutted mitigating evidence that they were not fully
culpable for their acts. Second, the Court's MPC-derived capital
jurisprudence has fostered procedures with many of the same
deficiencies inherent in the pre-Furman era of unguided jury
discretion, while investing the decision-making process with an aura
of "legality" that diminishes the sentencer's sense of personal moral
responsibility.9 Despite thirty years under Furman's rubric, death
penalty decision-making is as arbitrary and unguided as ever.'0
In Part I of this article, I discuss the theoretical infrastructure of
the Model Penal Code's treatment of homicide and the death penalty.
That infrastructure was developed in early work that Herbert
7. See Kevin R. Reitz, Model Penal Code: Sentencing, Plan for Revision 6 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 525 (2002).
8. Wechsler's anti-retributivist views have done little to detract from the tremendous
influence his scholarship has exerted on the shape of contemporary criminal law. In
particular, Wechsler's influence can be seen in the refinement of mens rea concepts,
wherein "the dominant view today sees an essential link between punishment and moral
wrongdoing." Alan C. Michaels, "Rationales" of Criminal Law Then and Now: For a
Judgmental Descriptivism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 54,57 (2000).
9. See Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SuP. CT. REV. 305, 383 ("The
formal, legalistic image of the law of capital punishment that the jury now receives from
the court and the prosecutor is often a great advantage to the state.").
10. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on
Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355,
359 (1995) ("[T]he overall effect of twenty-odd years of doctrinal head-banging has been
to substantially reproduce the pre-Furman [sic] world of capital sentencing."); Weisberg,
supra note 9, at 313 ("Despite its apparent formal complexity, the Model Penal Code's
proposed capital sentencing law only minimally constrains the jury's discretion.").
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Wechsler, who was the MPC's first Chief Reporter, produced in
conjunction with his senior colleague, Jerome Michael. Considered
together, commentary to the MPC and Wechsler and Michael's
influential treatment of criminal homicide provide a clear outline of
the utilitarian, offender-based theory of punishment that underlies
the Code, and which places an inordinate emphasis on the character
of the offender, principally defined as his perceived "future
dangerousness."
In Part II, I demonstrate that just as the states borrowed heavily
from the Code to fashion post-Furman capital punishment schemes,
so too the Court borrowed heavily from the Code, and from
Wechsler's offender-based theory of sentencing, to fashion an
accompanying capital jurisprudence. Although that approach has
provided important protections to capital defendants, it also imposed
substantial burdens by expanding the state's freedom to introduce
virtually any type of inflamatory evidence regarding the defendant
and his characters.
In Part III, I argue that the Court has continued to recognize the
uniquely powerful role that retribution plays in any capital
punishment scheme. In the death penalty context, the Court has
essentially repudiated the anti-retributivist views held by Wechsler
and embedded in the Code's death penalty provisions. However,
because the Court has continued to sanction the procedural structures
outlined by the MPC - structures which reflect the non-retributive
theoretical underpinnings of the Code - contemporary sentencing
procedures lack coherence.
I thus attempt, in Part IV, to sketch out a retributive approach to
capital sentencing. Such an approach would diverge from the
utilitarian, offender-based model envisioned by Wechsler and
codified in the MPC in three ways. First, the evidentiary universe
upon which sentencing decisions are made would be more tightly
circumscribed to .ensure that the sentencing decision is based on
appropriate retributive considerations. Although the virtually
unlimited rules of relevance currently applicable at the penalty phase
are typically thought to favor capital defendants, in fact, they place
those defendants who are least deserving of a death sentence at
special risk, because they allow prosecutors to introduce
inflammatory character evidence that often rhetorically overwhelms
relevant mitigating evidence of reduced or diminished culpability.
Second, the paradigm by which aggravating and mitigating factors are
"weighed" would be abandoned. Contrary to what is implied by
typical "weighing" schemes, aggravating and mitigating circumstances
[Vol. 31:3
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are not reverse sides of the same coin, and cannot validly or reliably
be compared.
Third, I argue that in recrafting the penalty phase, it would be
essential also to disaggregate mitigation evidence, which concerns
"moral desert," from mercy pleas, in which defendants seek leniency
even where a more severe punishment may, under retributive
principles, be warranted. The "bad character" evidence that is now
routinely admitted at penalty phase proceedings should be admissible
only to rebut a defendant's plea for mercy, not in response to
evidence of diminished culpability. To bring death penalty procedure
more in line with contemporary understandings of the death penalty's
retributive justification, the ghost of Herbert Wechsler must be
exorcised from the constitutional law of capital sentencing.1
I. Capital Punishment and the Model Penal Code: Penalizing
"Dangerous Character" -
Professor Herbert Wechsler was one of the most influential
proponents of utilitarianism in criminal theory,12 and was one of the
most influential shapers of the contemporary approach to capital
jurisprudence. His position as the first Chief Reporter for the ALI's
Model Penal Code ensured a dominant role in the drafting of that
critically important document, and helped to ensure, for better or
worse, his strong theoretical influence in the approach to capital
punishment adopted in the MPC. 3 That approach can be traced to a
11. ' Indisputably, the best way to resolve the inherent tensions that beset the effort to
administer the death penalty is to abolish it. For purposes of this article, I accept, as the
ALl did when it first drafted the MPC death penalty provisions, that regardless of the
moral and policy wisdom of capital punishment, it will persist as a practice for the
foreseeable future. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(2) cmt. 1 at 110-11 (Official Draft
and Revised Commentaries, Part II 1980).
12. Wechsler was a self-described utilitarian. See Norman Silber & Geoffrey Miller,
Toward "Neutral Principles" in the Law: Selections from the Oral History of Herbert
Wechsler, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 854, 869 (1993) (observing that "I have always been
exceedingly utilitarian in my views and approaches").
13. By all accounts, Wechsler was "the undisputed father of the Model Penal Code."
Erik Luna, Principled Enforcement of Penal Codes, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 515, 517
(2000); see also Tom Stacy, Changing Paradigms in the Law of Homicide, 62 OHIO ST. L.J.
1007, 1072 n.240 (2001) (recognizing Wechsler's influence on the capital punishment
provisions of MPG). Wechsler's hand in bringing the Code into being was wide and
varied: "He drafted a large part of the Code's general part, oversaw the whole, and played
a key role in the commentaries that accompanied the Tentative Drafts." Harold Edgar,
Herbert Wechsler and the Criminal Law: A Brief Tribute, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1347, 1352-
53 (2000) (recognizing Wechsler as the "architect," "engineer,] and chief craftsman" of
the MPG).
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pair of landmark articles co-authored by Professor Wechsler and
Professor Jerome Michael in 1937, which posited a sophisticated non-
retributivist account of the law of homicide.
1 4
A. A New Rationale For the Law of Homicide
While the common law of homicide was shaped in the spirit of
lex talionis - the biblical notion of "an eye for an eye," 5 Wechsler and
Michael sought to recast the law of homicide in the spirit of the great
enlightenment utilitarians, Bentham and Beccaria, and their codifying
disciples, Livingston and Stephen,'6 and the proposition that the
primary aims of criminal punishment are the "deterrence of potential
offenders and the incapacitation and reformation of actual
offenders.' 7 This understanding of the aims of criminal law naturally
grew out of the Benthamite view that "the end to be achieved is the
protection of the public against human behavior that has undesirable
consequences."' 8  Wechsler and Michael affirmatively rejected
14. See Herbert Wechsler & Jerome Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide: I,
37 COLUM. L. REV. 701 (1937) [hereinafter Wechsler & Michael I]; Herbert Wechsler &
Jerome Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide: II, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 1261 (1937)
[hereinafter Wechsler & Michael II]. Wechsler subsequently stated that in writing these
articles, the authors were even then "trying to influence the ALI effort" to draft a model
penal code. Silber & Miller, supra note 14, at 869.
15. See Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The
Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 844-45 (1969) (discussing codification and
development of the lex talionis in the English common law).
16. See generally, JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
MORALS AND LEGISLATION (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart, eds., The Athlone Press 1970)
(1780); JEREMY BENTHAM, 1 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM (Russell & Russell
1962) (1843); JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF THE PENAL LAW (Edinburgh, W. Tait
1843); EDWARD LIVINGSTON, THE COMPLETE WORKS ON CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE:
CONSISTING OF SYSTEMS OF PENAL LAWS FOR THE STATE OF LOUISIANA AND FOR THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: WITH THE INTRODUCTORY REPORTS TO THE SAME
(Patterson Smith 1968) (1873); CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS AND
OTHER WRITINGS (Richard Bellamy ed., Richard Davies et al. trans., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1995); Wechsler & Michael II, supra note 14, at 1268 n.22 (explaining that "our
effort has been to take the scheme of ideas set forth in such books as [Bentham's
Principles of Morals and Legislation and Livingston's The Complete Works on Criminal
Jurisprudence] and develop or modify them for our purpose in the light of a century of
writing on the problems with which they dealt"); id. at 1263-64 n.7 (noting agreement with
the general theoretical approach of Beccaria); JAMES F. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND (London, MacMillan 1883).
17. Wechsler & Michael II, supra note 14, at 1262.
18. Herbert Wechsler, A Caveat on Crime Control, 27 AM. INST. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 629, 631 (1937); see also Wechsler & Michael I, supra note 14, at 702
(starting point in their analysis of the law of homicide: That "[a]ll men agree that in
general it is desirable to prevent homicide and bodily injury," and, thus, that "[t]he scope
of reasonable controversy is therefore limited to the way in which the criminal law can and
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retributivism as an appropriate basis for the development of a
modern penal code.' 9 Their aversion to retributive theory went so far
as to compel them to avoid even uttering the word "punishment;"
they preferred the term "treatment. '"2 ° When Wechsler and Michael
did invoke the language of punishment, or "punitive treatment," they
did so primarily to suggest that offenders may "be treated punitively
for the sake of deterrence.,
21
Wechsler's project, as it developed over the course of his long
and distinguished career, was consistent with the modernizing spirit of
the progressive movement: To extract criminal law from its common
law origins and refound it based on sound, scientific principles.
Wechsler viewed criminal law's obsession with retribution as one of
its particularly antiquated features. According to Wechsler, present
penal codes were ineffective in large part because of "the extent to
which sanctions are governed by the injury inflicted rather than the
future danger the defendant may present and the requirements for an
effective therapy., 22 Wechsler was thus a strong proponent of shifting
the focus of criminal punishment from a "balancing of accounts" to a
forward-looking consideration of social interests.
To effectuate that goal, Wechsler and Michael proposed a
sentencing regime that empowered the sentencer to thoroughly
evaluate the offender's character, defined as the "sum of a man's
potentialities for good and evil conduct at whatever time they are
estimated., 23  By focusing on character, Wechsler and Michael
argued, criminal law could simultaneously fulfill its functions both as
a deterrent to the "generality of men" and as a treatment of the
particular offender (for either incapacitative or rehabilitative
purposes).
Of course, the ultimate aspiration of criminal law is to deter
should operate to this end.")
19. Wechsler & Michael I, supra note 14, at 730 n.126 (rejecting the "contention that
the penal law should serve the end of retribution").
20. See, e.g., id. at 729 ("[A]ny provision of the criminal law serves the end of
protecting life in so far as it makes possible the incapacitative or reformative treatment or
[sic] persons who, unless they were subjected to such treatment, would engage in behavior
threatening life.").
21. Id. at 728.
22. See Herbert Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARV. L. REV.
1097, 1103 (1952).
23. Wechsler & Michael II, supra note 14, at 1272.
24. Wechsler & Michael I, supra note 14, at 730-31.
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antisocial conduct rather than merely to treat it.25 But Wechsler and
Michael argued that a character-focused penal theory would serve
both goals. For purposes of deterrence, careful evaluations of
character are important to determine how severe penalties must be in
order to achieve sufficient deterrent effect on different classes of
offenders.26 Character evaluations are also important with respect to
treatment. Wechsler and Michael reasoned that incapacitation was
only sensible if the individual subject to treatment was "sufficiently
more likely than the generality of men to engage in undesirable
behavior in the future, ' '27 or, in modern parlance, if the individual
posed a risk of future dangerousness. Likewise, they argued, the
severity of the criminal penalty should be proportioned to the extent
or severity of the risk of such dangerousness. 28  "[T]he more
dangerous men are, the more desirable it is that they be thoroughly
incapacitated."29  Thus, regardless of whether deterrence or
incapacitation (or possibly, rehabilitation)3" is preferred, "the problem
of estimating the characters of offenders is the same.31
The approach to homicide law advocated by Wechsler and
Michael shared features in common with a traditional, retribution-
25. However, "for deterrence to work effectively to prevent antisocial behavior, the
behavior triggering the imposition of "treatment" must be "desirable to prevent and
possible to deter." Id. at 731.
26. Wechsler & Michael II, supra note 14, at 1291 ("[T]he penalties designed to
control relatively good men on the more or less rare occasions when they are moved to
evil deeds need not be as vigorous as those directed at bad men who are habitually moved
to such acts .... ").
27. Wechsler & Michael I, supra note 14, at 731.
28. Because of their rejection of retributive principles, Wechsler and Michael were
relatively unconstrained by conventional notions of moral culpability in assessing
dangerousness. For instance, Wechsler and Michael viewed "behavior attributable to
physical or psychical condition which is permanent" as grounds for greater incapacitation,
because of the irremediable danger persons with such conditions posed to society.
Wechsler & Michael II, supra note 14, at 1300. Only temporary, or treatable, physical or
psychical disorders were seen as appropriate mitigators of punishment. Id.
29. Id. at 1269-70.
30. Rehabilitation is either consistent or inconsistent with the goals of incapacitation
and deterrence, depending on whether it is possible to design an incapacitative treatment
sufficiently unpleasant to deter, and of sufficient duration to protect society while the
individual poses a threat, but which also actually succeeds in reforming the wrongdoer.
Wechsler and Michael were, rightly, skeptical that such a course of treatment was possible.
31. Wechsler & Michael II, supra note 15, at 1315 ("ITjhe problem of estimating the
characters of offenders is the same problem whether character is estimated in order to
determine the extent of incapacitation or the severity of punitive treatment for deterrent
purposes."). If reformation is prioritized over both deterrence and incapacitation,
however, it might or might not require fundamentally different orders of treatment to
offenders. Id. at 1318-1324.
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centered, sentencing theory. For instance, they recognized that any
rational system must incorporate the principle of proportionality, that
is, that "the severity of penalties should be correlated with the
relative undesirability of the behavior for which they are imposed.,
32
They argued, however, that proportionality could be justified on
grounds other than the retributive aim of giving offenders their "just
deserts,, 3  but that strict proportionality between "treatment" and
"moral guilt" was unnecessary?4 One of the most serious drawbacks
of rigid proportionality, Wechsler and Michael argued, was that it was
impossible to make reliable judgments about the character of the
offender based solely on the nature of his or her criminal act.35
Rather, the type and duration of treatment appropriate could
only be determined based on a careful analysis of the "actor's physical
and psychical condition at the time of his act, of his past, and of the
changes wrought in him by the criminal experience itself., 36 Although
the aims prioritized by Wechsler and Michael - deterrence,
incapacitation and reform - point penal policy solutions in different
directions, the authors suggested a practical convergence of solutions
- centering on the need to incapacitate most extensively those
exhibiting the most defective characters - regardless of which specific
penal theory - deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation - was
accorded priority. After all, those persons with the best characters
are the easiest to deter, are least in need of incapacitation, and are
most amenable to reform.37
Wechsler and Michael's belief that the proper disposition of a
criminal offender depends on an understanding of the dangerousness
of his character led them to reconceptualize the functions played by
the traditional indicia of moral gravity: the harm reasonably
foreseeable to the actor and the actor's culpability - that is, the
32. Id. at 1269.
33. Id. at 1265-66 (arguing that the "popular insistence upon an ordering of the
severity of punitive treatment is not necessarily based upon a retributive philosophy, as
many have come to think").
34. Wechsler & Michael I, supra note 15, at 730 n.126 (arguing that "no legal
provision can be criticized merely on the ground that it fails to... call[] for the
punishment of the morally guilty by a penalty proportionate to their moral guilt").
35. "[W]hile we cannot ignore our evaluation of different sorts of criminal behavior in
making inferences as to the characters of criminals from the nature of their criminal
behavior, neither can we regard it as conclusive. More than this, we ought not base our
judgment of the character of a criminal upon' his criminal conduct alone, and there is no
reason why we should try to do so." Wechsler & Michael II, supra note 14, at 1273.
36. Id. at 1273.
37. Id. at 1291.
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mental state, or mens rea, accompanying the acts. Rather than
apportion judgment based on the actor's mens rea alone, Wechsler
and Michael believed that such aspects of the offense should be
viewed as subordinate components in the larger project of estimating
the character of the offender, and judging "the extent to which his
values are askew.,
38
This reconceptualization of the grading inquiry undergirded what
is perhaps the most radical break from traditional law in their work:
the rejection of the significance of deliberation. Building on
arguments made by Sir James Fitzjames Stephen,39 they reasoned that
the traditional "premeditation" or "deliberation" requirement, so
central historically to an evaluation of the objective seriousness of a
homicide, is only relevant to a rational evaluation of the severity of
the offense, or the appropriate severity of punishment, to the extent
that "the more carefully considered and the less impulsive the act is,
the more it indicates basic perversion of the actor's conceptions of
good and evil."'  They thus concluded that "deliberation has no
independent significance" in the grading or punishment of offenses.41
Although the attack on the relevance of deliberation, and the
broader critique of the whole doctrine of malice aforethought, was
amply justified,"2 it also was consistent with Wechsler and Michael's
campaign to unseat retributivism from its traditional pride of place.
Malice, premeditation, and deliberation each provides a tool,
however compromised through centuries of common law usage, to
measure the degree of volition motivating the offender's criminal
38. See, e.g., id. at 1278; id. at 1277 ("[T]he less dangerous to life he believed his act to
be, the less is the depreciation of the value of human life which his act indicates and,
hence, the less grave the moral weakness which it manifests, even though the defect to
which it points is habitual."); id. at 1280 ("[T]he more cruel the actor's homicidal behavior
is, the more extensively it imperils life, limb and property, the more inappropriate any
homicide or the particular homicidal behavior is as a means to the actor's ends, the greater
his demoralization is indicated to be.").
39. See STEPHEN, supra note 16, at 94; see also REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION
APPOINTED TO CONSIDER THE LAW RELATING TO INDICTABLE OFFENSES (1879),
reprinted in 6 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS 373 §§ 174-175 (1971).
40. Wechsler & Michael II, supra note 14, at 1283.
41. Id. at 1284.
42. The abandonment of the doctrine of malice aforethought could easily be justified
regardless of one's philosophical orientation. As Wechsler and Michael noted, and as the
commentary to the MPC reiterated, the idea of malice aforethought had, over time, been
reduced to a virtually meaningless formula that signified little more than intent to kill. It
therefore could not logically serve, as it was called to do, to separate merely "intentional"
homicides from "premeditated" or "deliberate" ones deserving more severe punishment.
See MODEL PENAL CODE, § 210.6 cmt. at 69 (Tentative Draft No. 9, 1959).
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act.43 They thus serve as (sometimes crude) yardsticks of culpability,
and in that manner play an important role in a system of criminal
justice based on retribution. As Wechsler and Michael observed,
however, those markers serve little purpose if the primary question is
not desert but future dangerousness. After all, a premeditated
murder and a spontaneous murder both result in a dead victim, and it
is far from clear that a person who deliberately and with
premeditation chooses to kill another poses a greater future danger to
society, or is more in need of rehabilitation, than one who, at the
slightest provocation and without any deliberation at all, takes a life."
Wechsler and Michael therefore argued that the proper indicia of
the defendant's dangerousness is not deliberation, but habituation.
That is, the goal of the character inquiry is to determine whether the
criminal act committed by the offender reflects a "habitual" or a
"sporadic" ordering of the offender's passions and reason."
Individuals evidencing "habitual defect of character" pose the
greatest threat to society,46 and are properly subject to the most
extensive treatment. To make such a judgment, however, the
sentencer must consider much more information than typically was
available to a judge or jury following the guilt phase of a criminal
trial. For instance, the sentencer must consider not only the extent to
which the defendant acted purposefully or inadvertently and the
extent to which the actor intended the consequences of the acts, but
also the motivations that caused the acts and the ends the actor
sought to achieve thereby, antecedent circumstances such as relevant
provocations, the actor's physical and psychical condition, his history,
and the extent to which he demonstrates remorse for his conduct. 7
As Wechsler and Michael explained, "[t]he character of men is
revealed in part by the needs which they seek, by the desires which
they endeavor to satisfy, as well as by the ways in which they try to
satisfy them."'  Only the most comprehensive evaluation of the
offender's life history and moral values would provide sufficient
information to make informed sentencing choices.
43. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 156 (1987) ("The ancient concept of malice
aforethought was an early attempt to focus on mental state in order to distinguish those
who deserved death from those who through 'Benefit of... Clergy' would be spared.")
(citing 23 Hen. 8, c. 1, §§ 3, 4 (1531) (Eng.)).
44. Wechsler & Michael II, supra note 14, at 1284.
45. Id. at 1273.
46. Id. at 1286.
47. Id. at 1274-1290.
48. Id. at 1277.
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That broad inquiry, however, must be structured to ensure that
sentences are consistent and rational. Thus, foreshadowing the
approach adopted by the ALI twenty-odd years later, Wechsler and
Michael formulated two extensive lists of factors they thought should
be considered by the sentencer49 in fixing a sentence." One list
described factors "favorable to mitigation,"'" another described
factors "unfavorable to mitigation. 5 2  The "extenuating" and
"aggravating" factors identified by Wechsler and Michael emerged
from their basic premise that appropriate punishment may only be
determined through an evaluation of all logically-relevant facts that
contribute to an estimation of the degree of defect of the offender's
moral character. Such an inquiry .cannot be reduced to a simple
formula, they contended, because "[i]t is impossible in the present
state of knowledge to determine with any precision what weight
49. Wechsler and Michael urged that sentencing proceedings be bifurcated from guilt
proceedings, and recommended that the sentencing decision should be entrusted either to
the judge presiding over the trial or to a tribunal or agency "specially constituted for the
purpose," rather than a jury. Id. at 1311.
50. Wechsler and Michael were not the first codifiers to employ this practice. In one
of the first comprehensive efforts to codify criminal law, Edward Livingston adopted the
practice. See EDWARD LIVINGSTON, A SYSTEM OF PENAL LAW FOR THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA: CONSISTING OF A CODE OF CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS, A CODE
OF PROCEDURE IN CRIMINAL CASES, A CODE OF PRISON DISCIPLINE, AND A BOOK OF
DEFINITIONS, PREPARED AND PRESENTED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE UNITED STATES (William S. Hein & Co. 2000) (1858).
51. Wechsler & Michael II, supra note 14, at 1300. Factors favorable to mitigation
included the following: (1) Slight probability that behavior will cause death; (2) consent of
the person killed; (3) behavior infrequent; (4) behavior serves some desirable ends; (5)
creation of risk inadvertent; (6) death not intended and risk low; (7) good motives, i.e.,
desirable ends; (8) great provocation; (9) behavior attributable to physical condition or
well defined psychical disorder which is temporary or remediable; (10) past life indicative
of good habits; (11) youth, especially if disadvantaged; (12) sensitive response to homicidal
experience; (13) death not intended and homicidal means involving danger to the actor as
well as to others; (14) no undesirable result in the particular case; of greater importance
when death is intended or risk created inadvertently than when death is not intended but
risk created consciously; (15) behavior attributable to some injustice to the actor as an
external cause.
52. Id. Factors deemed unfavorable to mitigation include: (1) High probability that
behavior will cause death; (2) lives of many persons endangered; (3) other interests
endangered in addition to the preservation of life; (4) unusually painful death threatened;
(5) behavior frequent; (6) behavior serves no desirable ends; (7) unjustifiable risk
consciously created; (8) death intended or degree of risk known to be high; (9) bad
motives, i.e., undesirable ends; (10) means unnecessarily dangerous, cruel or indicative of
professionality; (11) slight provocation; (12) behavior attributable to physical or psychical
condition which is permanent; (13) past life indicative of bad habits, especially criminal
habits; (14) maturity; (15) insensitive response to homicidal experience; (16) widespread
conditions of provocation may warrant general heightening of severity and fewer
distinctions among persons; (17) undesirable result in the particular case.
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should be given the various aggravating and extenuating
circumstances, either absolutely or relatively."53  The appropriate
"treatment" can only be determined, they argued, based on a
"complete analysis of the particular case, an analysis that will take
into account the presence or absence of each relevant factor."5
Indeed, what treatment is proper ultimately turns not only on an
educated understanding of the defendant's future potentialities, but
also on a judgment of the individual's "relative social worth."55
Accordingly, sentencing determinations require a comprehensive
understanding of virtually every aspect of the offender's life history
and character to arrive at an appropriate "treatment" for a criminal
act, the latter a symptom of the greater disease and a rationale for
intervention. The relevance of facts to sentencing is limited not by
the circumstances surrounding the offense, but rather by all the
considerations that are relevant to a judgment of relative social worth
and dangerousness and the prospects for "treatment" of that
individual. 6 With no scientific mechanism to resolve those questions,
the sentencer, like a novelist, is left to construct a narrative out of the
raw material available. 7 If the motivation for the offense is one which
indicates a small likelihood of repetition, or establishes that the
individual poses little threat to the community in the future, a less
severe punishment is warranted. If, however, the evidence indicates
that the individual poses a great threat of future harm, then the
principles of general deterrence - deterring others with a similar
disposition - specific deterrence - deterring this particular individual
- and incapacitation - by killing him, if necessary - justify imposing
punitive treatment.5
The utilitarian, offender-based framework set forth by Wechsler
and Michael was exceedingly influential in academic circles and
53. Id. at 1301.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1263.
56. These include factors relevant to an estimation of the harm that was foreseeable
to the actor at the time he or she engaged in the offensive conduct. The foreseeability
requirement is necessary to the coherence of a deterrence-based approach. More severe
punishment based on the totality of consequences will not deter persons from committing
acts to the extent that those consequences are not reasonably foreseeable.
57. Wechsler & Michael II, supra note 15, at 1273.
58. Of course, in reality predictions of future dangerousness are highly unreliable.
Therefore, in practice, the utilitarian deterrent approach to punishment is no more
"scientific" than any other. See infra, text accompanying note 332.
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among practicing jurists of the day.59 Indeed, the framework laid
down by Wechsler and Michael" formed the foundation for the
approach to capital punishment adopted 25 years later by the
American Law Institute in the Model Penal Code, and ultimately,
embraced by the Supreme Court as the states sought out new
procedural models to replace constitutionally outmoded ones in the
post-Furman era."
B. Codifying the New Rationale
Wechsler continued to develop his utilitarian, non-retributivist
penal theories in subsequent years until the completion of the Model
Penal Code in 1963. In drafting the Code, he hoped to encourage
legislatures to replace retributive principles - what he referred to as
"concessions to retaliatory passions" - with a penal approach directed
solely to the ends of "diminishing the incidence of major injuries to
individuals and institutions."62 "In short," Wechsler argued, "while
invocation of a penal sanction necessarily depends on past behavior,
the object is control of harmful conduct in the future." 63
The offender-based sentencing approach eventually adopted by
59. For instance, the sentencing philosophy advocated by Wechsler and Michael of
basing the sentence on the possession of the fullest information possible concerning the
defendant's life and characteristics was adopted by the Supreme Court in Williams v. New
York, 337 U.S. 241, 247-48 (1949) (referring to "a prevalent modern philosophy of
penology that the punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime ....
Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law. Reformation and
rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence.")
(citation omitted); id. at 247 ("The belief no longer prevails that every offense in a like
legal category calls for an identical punishment without regard to the past life and habits
of a particular offender."); see also Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 484 (1946)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citing Wechsler and Michael I, supra note 14, at 703-04). In
Williams, the new philosophy of penology was employed to affirm the trial court's
decision, based on his review of a presentence report, to override the jury's
recommendation of a life sentence and instead impose a sentence of death. Commenting
on the case, one scholar characterized the outcome as incapacitation prevailing over
mitigation. FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 5-6
(Yale Univ. Press 1981).
60. In turn, Wechsler was highly influenced by the work of Sir James Fitzjames
Stephen. See Wechsler, supra note 22, at 1131 (noting Stephen's impact on the course of
English criminal legislation).
61. See, e.g., Conference: The Death Penalty in the Twenty-First Century, 45 AM. U. L.
REV. 239, 247-48 (1995) (noting that "when the states went back basically to rewrite their
statutes, ... they ended up falling back on procedures that had been devised by no less an
authority than Professor Herbert Wechsler, when he was one of the principal reporters
and draftsmen of the American Law Institute Model Penal Code back in the 1950s").
62. Wechsler, supra note 22, at 1105.
63. Id.
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the ALl embodied virtually all of the prescriptions earlier advocated
by Wechsler and Michael, including the foundational view that the
principal determinant of sentence is not the moral desert of the
offender but his perceived future dangerousness. ' This shift in focus
from desert to dangerousness,65 as Paul Robinson has observed, is
reflected throughout the MPC. 6  To be sure, the MPC reflects a
multiplicity of foundational values. But its overall tenor was
overwhelmingly, and self-consciously,61 in the direction of the
utilitarian and non-retributivist preferences of its principal reporter,'
reflecting, as the ALI's plan for revision notes, the "supposition that
retributive considerations should not play any important role in
policymaking or case-specific dispositions."'
The Code's death penalty provisions shared the same theoretical
approach. The non-retributivist leanings of the Code's drafters were
reflected in a report on the death penalty accompanying the 1959
draft of the Model Penal Code, which framed the death penalty
debate itself as a contest between "ancient" retributivist impulses and
progressive democratic enlightenment:
64. As the ALI revisionists have recently explained:
The Code's chosen mechanism was selective incapacitation, based on the belief
that judges and parole officials, primarily through careful observation of
offenders (although aided somewhat by the datum of past behavior), could
accurately select out those offenders who were especially dangerous to society,
and who should therefore be confined for terms much longer than the typical
criminal.
Reitz, supra note 7, at 552 (emphasis added).
65. To be sure, the MPC does provide that factors such as the nature of the offender's
acts and intentions, as well as his character narrowly construed, are relevant to sentence.
However, these factors are relevant primarily because they are the best indicators of
future dangerousness.
66. Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as
Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1447-48 (2001) (noting that the MPC
"generally grades inchoate offenses the same as substantive ones," reflecting the drafters'
goal of "maximiz[ing] societal control over dangerous people").
67. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02 (Official Draft and Revised
Commentaries, Part 11985) (detailing the purposes and principles of construction for the
MPG); see also MODEL PENAL CODE Articles 6 & 7, introductory cmt. at 2 (Official Draft
and Revised Commentaries, Part 1 1985) (explaining that the "Model Penal Code's
approach to sentencing is basically utilitarian or consequentialist").
68. It does, however, in a nod to retributive values, acknowledge that punitive
treatment is appropriate, at times, not only in response to the "risk that the defendant will
commit another crime" or to allow for "correctional treatment," but also "to avoid the
depreciation of the seriousness of the crime, under the circumstances of its perpetration."
Herbert Wechsler, Sentencing, Correction, and the Model Penal Code, 109 U. PA. L. REV.
465, 476 (1961).
69. Reitz, supra note 7, at 549.
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[T]he struggle about this punishment has been one between
ancient and deeply rooted beliefs in retribution, atonement or
vengeance on the one hand, and, on the other, beliefs in the
personal value and dignity of the common man that were born
of the democratic movement of the eighteenth century, as well
as beliefs in the scientific approach to an understanding of the
motive forces of human conduct, which are the result of the
growth of the sciences of behavior during the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. °
Reflecting the offender-based sentencing theory, the Code
adopted Wechsler and Michael's broad conception of the evidence
that was relevant to sentencing decisions. As the MPC provides, the
sentencer must be entitled to consider evidence "as to any matter that
the Court deems relevant to sentence, including but not limited to the
nature and circumstances of the crime, the defendant's character,
,,71background, history, mental and physical condition ....
To facilitate the evaluation, the Code borrowed the analytical
device of enumerating aggravating and mitigating considerations.
Recognizing that most jurisdictions provided sentencers almost
absolute discretion to impose death sentences, this device was
deemed desirable to impose "tighter controls" to "guide" the exercise
of court or jury discretion.7 ' The aggravating and mitigating
circumstances enumerated in the Model Penal Code constitute a
pared-down and refined version of the list proposed in Wechsler and
Michael's earlier work,73 albeit one which, on the mitigating side,
70. THORSTEN SELLIN, THE DEATH PENALTY: A REPORT FOR THE MODEL PENAL
CODE PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE 15 (1959).
71. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
72. Id.
73. Aggravating circumstances as set forth in section 210.6(3) of the Model Penal
Code:
(a) The murder was committed by a convict under sentence of imprisonment.
(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another murder or of a felony
involving the use or threat of violence to the person.
(c) At the time the murder was committed the defendant also committed another
murder.
(d) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons.
(e) The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged or was an
accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after
committing or attempting to commit robbery, rape or deviate sexual intercourse
by force or threat of force, arson, burglary or kidnapping.
(f) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful
arrest or effecting an escape from lawful custody.
(g) The murder was committed for pecuniary gain.
(h) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting
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retains more of the traditional formulations of excuses and
justifications, and on the aggravating side, more of the traditional
criteria, such as felony-murder, relied upon by the common law to
identify especially serious homicidal conduct, than did Wechsler and
Michael's list.74
The Model Penal Code also adopted Wechsler and Michael's
argument that the traditional criteria used to distinguish capital from
non-capital offenses - the concepts of premeditation and deliberation
- should be abandoned.75 As the comments to the Code explain, "the
notion that prior reflection should distinguish capital from non-capital
murder is fundamentally unsound."76  In place of clearly defined
degrees of murder, the MPC adopted a sliding scale approach that
recognizes multiple factors as relevant to the determination of
appropriate punishment: "[T]here are not in fact two classes of
exceptional depravity.
Mitigating circumstances as set forth in section 210.6(4) of the Model Penal Code:
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.
(b) The murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
(c) The victim was a participant in the defendant's homicidal conduct or
consented to the homicidal act.
(d) The murder was committed under circumstances which the defendant
believed to provide a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct.
(e) The defendant was an accomplice in a murder committed by another person
and his participation in the homicidal act was relatively minor.
(f) The defendant acted under duress or under the domination of another person.
(g) At the time of the murder, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the
criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or
intoxication.
(h) The youth of the defendant at the time of the crime.
Model Penal Code § 210.6(3)-(4) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
74. Compare the mitigating factors described by Wechsler and Michael, see supra
note 51 (e.g., "(3) behavior infrequent," "(7) good motives, i.e., desirable ends," "(10) past
life indicative of good habits)," with the mitigating factors enumerated in the MPC, see
supra note 73 (e.g., " (b) extreme mental or emotional disturbance," "(d) justification," "(f)
duress," "(g) mental disease or defect or intoxication").
75. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 cmt. at 70 (Tentative Draft No. 9, 1959)
(rejecting traditional reliance on finding of premeditation because fact of premeditation
may or may not bear about a "true reflection of the actor's normal character"); MODEL
PENAL CODE § 210.6 cmt. 4(b) at 127 (Official Draft and Revised Commentaries, Part II
1980) ("Crudely put, the judgment is that the person who plans ahead is worse than the
person who kills on sudden impulse. This generalization does not, however, survive
analysis.").
76. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 cmt. 4(b) at 128-33 (Official Draft and Revised
Commentaries, Part II 1980).
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murder but an infinite variety of offences which shade off by degrees
from the most atrocious to the most excusable" and the "factors
which determine whether the sentence of death is the appropriate
penalty in particular cases are too complex to be compressed within
the limits of a simple formula.... "77
Finally, the Model Penal Code's provisions reflected the
assumption that the character of the offender, defined as his future
dangerousness or reformability,7 is the primary issue in assessing
appropriate punishment. This in turn requires both a sui generis
inquiry to evaluate, and depends on consideration of types of
evidence not usually admissible at the guilt phase under traditional
rules of evidence. The Code thus bifurcated trial into separate guilty
and penalty phases,79 and required the sentencer in the penalty phase
to weigh a predetermined list of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances to arrive at a sentencing outcome." On the belief that
it is impossible to enumerate all the considerations proper to the
sentencing inquiry, the Code also stipulated that the sentencer should
be entitled to consider any other factors the Court deems relevant to
the sentencing determination. The drafters further recommended
that no capital sentence be imposed unless at least one aggravating
factor was established and "there is no substantial mitigating
circumstance."'" This approach, they argued, ensured that capital
sentences would not be imposed in cases where there were no
aggravating circumstances, but preserved the ability of the sentencer
to impose lesser punishment when mitigating circumstances so
warranted.
H. The Model Penal Code and the Landscape of
77. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 cmt. at 71 (Tentative Draft No. 9, 1959)(quoting
ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 174 (1953)).
78. Although, parts of the MPC suggest that a retributive character-based theory is
also operative. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(a) cmt. 4(a) at 55 (Official Draft
and Revised Commentaries, Part 11 1980) (noting that provocation is acknowledged as a
defense, even though it does not strictly impede intentionality, but rather heightens it, as
"a concession to human weakness and perhaps to non-deterrability, a recognition of the
fact that one who kills in response to certain provoking events should be regarded as
demonstrating a significantly different character deficiency than one who kills in their
absence").
79. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 cmt. at 74 (Tentative Draft No. 9, 1959) (advocating
separate proceedings to determine sentence).
80. Id. at 72.
81. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 cmt. 5 at 135 (Official Draft and Revised
Commentaries, Part II 1980).
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Contemporary Death Penalty Law
The analytical framework crafted by Wechsler proved
tremendously influential, and the basic infrastructure of
contemporary death penalty law adheres to the broad outlines
sketched out in the Model Penal Code. References to the MPC's
death penalty provisions first appeared in the Court's cases a year
before Furman was handed down, when Justice Harlan cited the lack
of state interest in adopting the statutory criteria suggested in the
Code as a reason to conclude that such criteria would not work.82 The
following year, after the Court in Furman struck down the nation's
death penalty laws, however, several states did turn to the MPC for
guidance. What followed is a familiar story.
In response to Furman, virtually every state then utilizing the
death penalty opted to rewrite, rather than abandon, its death penalty
laws. 3 The states' responses were of two principal types. In response
to Furman's call for objective standards and guidance, 8' eighteen
states resurrected mandatory death penalty statutes.85 If unguided
discretion was the problem, mandatory sentencing schemes were a
logical response.8 After all, if sentencers were improperly picking
and choosing who should live or die from among a pool of equally
82. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 202 (1971) ("In recent years academic and
professional sources have suggested that jury sentencing discretion should be controlled
by standards of some sort. The American Law Institute first published such a
recommendation in 1959."); id. at 203 (observing that, of the several states that have
modified their laws with respect to murder and the death penalty since 1959, "[n]one of
these States have followed the Model Penal Code and adopted statutory criteria for
imposition of the death penalty"); id. at 199 n.9 (citing Wechsler & Michael I). Indeed,
Harlan appended the Model Penal Code death penalty provisions to his opinion in
McGautha precisely to illustrate the apparent impossibility of identifying, before the fact,
who should live and who should die. Id. at 222-25.
83. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
84. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). In Furman, the Supreme
Court established the constitutional requirement that the sentencer's discretion to impose
the death penalty must be "channell[ed] and limit[ed]," and that juries must be provided
with "'clear and objective standards' that provide 'specific and detailed guidance,' and that
'make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death."' Walton v.
Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, (1990) (Scalia, J. concurring) (citations omitted).
85. See Model Penal Code § 210.6 cmt. 12(a) n.145 at 156 (Official Draft and Revised
Commentaries, Part II 1980).
86. North Carolina, for instance, enacted a statute that provided mandatory death
sentences for willful, deliberate, and premeditated killings and felony murders. N.C.'GEN.
STAT. § 14-17 (1975). Other states emulated the structure recommended in the Model
Penal Code, using enumerated and unenumerated aggravating and mitigating factors to
guide the sentencer's inquiry.
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culpable defendants, then mandating the death penalty for all who fit
in one legally-defined category was one way to guard against
selectivity bias at sentencing. The rest of the states modeled their
new death penalty laws on the MPC in an effort to do what Harlan
thought impossible: provide "statutory criteria for imposition of the
death penalty."'
Reviewing these various statutes, the Supreme Court rejected the
mandatory sentencing schemes,"' and approved those based on the
Model Penal Code.' According to the Court, both standardless and
mandatory sentencing schemes were constitutionally deficient, the
former because they gave rise to arbitrary and capricious sentencing
outcomes, and the latter because they failed to accord the individual
the requisite degree of individual consideration. In contrast, the MPC
approach seemed to strike the right balance: it imposed some
structure on the decision-making process, but it did not determine the
outcome, allowing the ultimate choice of sentence to turn on an
individualized consideration of its appropriateness in each case.
Virtually every death penalty jurisdiction now follows the MPC
model with greater or lesser variations.90 Commentators have thus
rightly observed that "the Code's death penalty standards have had a
greater impact on state legislation on this subject than on any other." 91
As noted above, the Supreme Court's constitutional capital
jurisprudence also reflects an acceptance of the MPC model. This is
manifested, most obviously, in the Court's validation of the MPC
model and rejection of mandatory sentencing schemes. Wechsler's
influence, however, penetrated to much deeper levels. Indeed, both
of the "twin pillars" 92 of the Court's constitutional capital
87. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 203.
88. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304; Roberts, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
89. Gregg 428 U.S. at 206-07 (rejecting argument that the death penalty was per se
unconstitutional, and upholding Georgia's guided discretion scheme, which established a
bifurcated death penalty procedure and directed the jury to consider specific aggravating
and mitigating circumstances in determining whether a death sentence was appropriate);
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); see also Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976)
(upholding Texas scheme).
90. See, e.g., Stacy, supra note 13 at 1016 ("[A]II death penalty regimes now
effectively follow the basic structure of the Model Penal Code.").
91. Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, A Punishment in Search of a Crime:
Standards for Capital Punishment in the Law of Criminal Homicide, 46 MD. L. REV. 115,
116 (1986). See also Markus Dirk Dubber, Penal Panopticon: The Idea of a Modern Model
Penal Code, 4 BuFF. CRIM. L. REV. 53, 90 (2000) (noting the Model Penal Code provided
a "highly influential blueprint for capital sentencing").
92. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 10, at 427.
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jurisprudence - the principles of "guided discretion" and "individual
consideration" - were drawn from the Model Penal Code. The
Court's rejection of Harlan's view in McGautha v. California,
specifically that limits on capital sentencing discretion were
unworkable, was premised on the MPC's contrary claims.93 "Guided
discretion" was an experiment predicated on the MPC model.
The Court's recognition of a constitutional right to individual
sentencing consideration also flowed directly from its acceptance of
the Wechsler/MPC premise that capital sentencing, like all
sentencing, should be based on a thorough evaluation of the character
of the offender. Because the Court accepted the idea that character
can be understood as the criminal propensity of the individual or the
future dangerousness he presents,9" it logically concluded that any
type of evidence is admissible that helps predict future
dangerousness. This criteria, in turn, opened the door to all the
evidence thought important by Wechsler and the ALI.9' In other
words, the doctrine of individual consideration and the decision to
permit future dangerousness to be argued at the penalty phase both
grow out of a philosophical belief that capital sentencing decisions
should turn on non-retributive, offender-based evaluations of the
defendant's character.96
Several important features of contemporary death penalty
procedure resulted from the Court's embrace of the MPC approach
to capital sentencing, two of which figure prominently here. First,
because the main inquiry in the sentencing determination is the
degree to which the defendant's character manifests a risk of future
dangerousness, any evidence indicative of "bad character" is logically
relevant - indeed, central - to the question of whether a capital
defendant should live or die. This has moved the Court to strip away
93. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195 n.47 (plurality opinion) (explaining that the
aggravator/mitigator weighing scheme developed by the Model Penal Code and adopted
by Georgia proved that "McGautha's assumption that it is not possible to devise standards
to guide and regularize jury sentencing in capital cases has been undermined by
subsequent experience").
94. Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 178 (1988) (holding that the sentencing jury is
free to evaluate defendant's character defined as "his likely future behavior").
95. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 203-204 (plurality opinion) ("[I]t [is] desirable for the jury to
have as much information before it as possible when it makes the sentencing decision.").
96. The Court's reliance on the Code as a basis for its new constitutional
jurisprudence of the death penalty is no accident. Commentary to the Model Penal Code
asserts that the Code's provisions were specifically drafted with the intent to provide "a
model for constitutional adjudication as well as for state legislation." MODEL PENAL
CODE § 210.6 cmt. 12(d) at 167 (Official Draft and Revised Commentaries, Part II 1980).
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virtually all evidentiary restrictions on mitigating and aggravating
evidence. Second, in order to provide guidance to the jury in
weighing all of the evidence proffered by the prosecution and
defense, the mechanism of weighing or balancing aggravating and
mitigating factors advocated by Wechsler and adopted by the MPC
has become the predominant analytical rubric for capital sentencing.'
A. Offender-Based Sentencing: The Good, the Bad, and the Expert
One of the most familiar refrains of post-Furman capital
jurisprudence is the proposition, advanced by Wechsler and codified
in the MPC, that the primary focus of capital sentencing must be a
thorough evaluation of the character of the defendant. Citing the
MPC, and echoing Wechsler and Michael, the plurality in Gregg
explained that capital sentencing requires careful scrutiny of the
character of the offender rather than a mere categorization of his
acts."' Such information, it reasoned, was "an indispensable
prerequisite to a reasoned determination of whether a defendant shall
live or die."'99 Accordingly, the Court has deemed it "desirable for the
jury to have as much information before it as possible when it makes
the sentencing decision.""
1. Individual Consideration
Although the constitutional requirement of "individual
consideration" was first articulated by the Supreme Court in
Woodson v. North Carolina,1 the requirement follows, indeed
constitutionalizes, the path trod by Wechsler and Michael and
adopted in the Model Penal Code, permitting all evidence "as to any
97. An additional consequence of the adoption of the MPC model, and one that is
logically concomitant to offender-based sentencing, and the use of the weighing paradigm,
is the Court's acceptance of the bifurcated sentencing procedures recommended by the
MPC as a presumed constitutional requisite.
98. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189 (citing, inter alia, MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.07, cmt. 1
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 1954) (recognizing that as a constitutional matter, the sentencer
must consider not only the offense but also "the character and propensities of the
offender") (emphasis added)); see also Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 251 (1976)
(sentencing determination requires sentencer to "focus on the circumstances of the crime
and the character of the individual defendant"); cf. Wechsler & Michael II, supra note 14
(advancing the view that consideration of the character of the individual is required).
99. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189.
100. Id. at 204 ; see also Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 275-76 ("What is essential is that
the jury have before it all possible relevant information about the individual defendant
whose fate it must determine.").
101. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976).
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matter that the Court deems relevant to sentence, including but not
limited to the nature and circumstances of the crime, the defendant's
character, background, history, mental and physical condition" to be
considered by the sentencer.1° The principle undergirded the Court's
conclusion that mandatory death penalty schemes, which otherwise
appeared to address the concerns expressed in many of the Furman
opinions that the death penalty was being applied inconsistently and
arbitrarily,' °3 were unconstitutional. The Court reasoned that
mandatory schemes that prohibit an individualized sentencing
procedure:
accord[] no significance to relevant facets of the character and
record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the
particular offense [and] exclude[] from consideration in fixing
the ultimate punishment of death the possibility of
compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse
frailties of humankind.
This famous language unmistakably echoes Wechsler and
Michael, endowing with constitutional stature their observation that
what is needed in making the extraordinarily elusive judgment as to
whether a sentence of death is appropriate is
that large understanding of the diversities that are possible in
human character and conduct, for that familiarity with the
actual range of the qualities of men who commit crimes and of
the characteristics of their behavior, and for that insight into the
individuality and motivation of particular offenders, which are
such essential conditions of making wisely those relative
judgments of good and evil which the determination of modes
of treatment demands. 1°5
Two years after Woodson was decided, the Court further refined
the individual consideration requirement in Lockett v. Ohio,'
06
wherein it struck down an Ohio death-penalty statute that limited the
102. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (Tentative Draft No. 9, 1959); see also MODEL
PENAL CODE § 210.6 (Official Draft and Revised Commentaries, Part II 1980).
103. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(concluding that the constitutional defect in unguided discretionary sentencing was located
in the structure of "legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so
freakishly imposed").
104. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
105. Wechsler & Michael II, supra note 14, at 1310. Interestingly, Wechsler and
Michael make this observation in the context of arguing that juries are ill-equipped to
make the necessary judgments of character required to reach fair and consistent
sentencing outcomes. The authors, rather, preferred referral of the issue of treatment to
"a permanent agency experienced in deciding such questions." Id. at 1311.
106. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
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mitigating evidence available to a jury to evidence falling into three
defined categories. With Lockett, the Court established that the
principle of individual consideration required
that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not
be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect
of a defendant's character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a
basis for a sentence less than death.17
The Court subsequently. clarified that not only are states
forbidden from precluding introduction of mitigating evidence, but
they also must ensure that the sentencer is "able to consider and give
effect to that evidence in imposing sentence."1°8  The Court has
interpreted that principle broadly. In Eddings v. Oklahoma, the
Court illustratively stated that relevant mitigating evidence includes
"evidence of a turbulent family history, of beatings by a harsh father,
and of severe emotional disturbance .... 109 The unfettered
mitigation inquiry has been defended on grounds that it preserves the
defendant's right, and the jury's prerogative, to mercy. By freeing
mitigation evidence from any strict requirement of legal relevance,
the Lockett principle reinforces the absolute entitlement of the
sentencer in a death penalty proceeding to exercise "discretion to
grant mercy in a particular case. ''H
As a result of Woodson, Lockett, Eddings, and their progeny,
states must permit defendants to introduce a range of mitigating
evidence unconstrained by traditional notions of legal relevance to
prove that their crime was not consistent with, or a manifestation of, a
morally defective or dangerous character. The individual
consideration principle established in the Woodson-Lockett line of
cases provides that "the sentencer must retain unbridled discretion to
107. Id. at 604 (emphasis added).
108. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989).
109. 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982); see also Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 381-82 (1990)
(discussing right to present mitigating evidence of good character and deprived
childhood); American Bar Association, American Bar Association Guidelines For The
Appointment And Performance Of Defense Counsel In Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA
L. REv. 913, 1061 (2003) (discussing obligation of counsel in capital cases to investigate
and develop broad range of mitigation evidence, including emphasis on "the impact of an
execution on the client's family, the client's prior positive contributions to the community,
or other factors unconnected to the crime which militate against his execution[,]" and that
"it is critically important to construct a persuasive narrative" providing the jury with "an
understanding of the client's extended, multi-generational history.. .from before
conception to the present").
110. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1144 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari) (expanding on views of the central role of mercy).
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afford mercy."''. The concept of mitigating evidence appears to
embrace virtually any fact the defendant proffers as a basis for a
sentence less than death, with the one, hardly limiting, stipulation that
it must relate either to the offense or the offender."2 Evidence of
good character, of course, falls in the heartland of mitigation
evidence, 3 and the defendant is entitled to proffer such evidence to
the jury in mitigation, even where it is admittedly irrelevant to the
defendant's "culpability for the crime he committed .... 14
2. The Admissibility of Evidence of the Defendant's Future
Dangerousness
For capital defendants, however, there is a darker side to the lack
of evidentiary restraints at sentencing. Following Wechsler's view
that character is best defined as the sum of the defendant's
"potentialities for good and evil," the Court has "deregulated""' 5 the
sentencing hearing to allow a virtually unchecked range of
aggravating evidence to be used to prove that the defendant has a
morally defective or dangerous character. 1 6 Just as defendants can
introduce a wide range of evidence that purportedly "mitigates" their
guilt, under a capital sentencing rubric that attempts to evaluate the
111. Id. at 1150 (emphasis added).
112. Of course, there is a distinction between what evidence a defendant is entitled to
offer and what his counsel is constitutionally compelled to offer. As Judge Posner has
observed, "[p]resumably, the lawyer is not required to investigate the defendant's past
with the thoroughness of a biographer." Stewart v. Gramley, 74 F.3d 132, 135-37 (7th Cir.
1996). That counsel is not constitutionally ineffective for failing to proffer such
biographically thorough mitigating evidence, however, does not thereby mean that a
defendant is not entitled to present such evidence to a jury if he wishes. Indeed, the
Lockett definition would seem expressly to protect the right to do just that.
113. See, e.g., Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 463 (1993) ([D]efendant introduces
evidence in mitigation, inter alia, of upbringing and positive character traits, regular
church attendance, and that "[hIe loved the Lord."); Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164,
177 (1988) (discussing the introduction of the defendant's clean prison disciplinary
record); Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 507 (1995) (discussing the introduction of
evidence that the defendant was a mother of seven children, held three jobs, and was an
active participant in her church).
114. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986) (reversing sentence due to
exclusion of testimony regarding defendant's good behavior in prison).
115. See generally Weisberg, supra note 9.
116. For example, the Court has stated:
We think that the Georgia court wisely has chosen not to impose unnecessary
restrictions on the evidence that can be offered at such a hearing and to approve
open and far-ranging argument .... We think it [is] desirable for the jury to have
as much information before it as possible when it makes the sentencing decision.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 203-04 (1976).
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dangerousness of the defendant's character, the state is equally
entitled to proffer aggravating evidence to the jury related to a
"myriad of factors""' 7  and "literally countless subjects."118  Of
particular note, it has permitted sentencing proceedings to focus not
only on what the defendant has done, but also, and perhaps more
importantly, on what he may likely do."9 Aside from race, religion,
and political affiliation, few factors have ever been deemed
constitutionally irrelevant to this inquiry.2 '
Although the emphasis on character has provided the basis for a
capital defendant's right to introduce a broad range of mitigating
evidence to prove "good character," the Wechslerian offender-based
sentencing model also justified, and perhaps logically mandated, a
laissez-faire attitude toward aggravating evidence to prove the
offender's "bad character." Indeed, the permissibility of using "bad
character" evidence directly follows Wechsler's vision of sentencing
as an individualized appraisal of the character of the defendant.'
Because of the acceptance of the Model Penal Code sentencing
model as authoritative, capital penalty trials are ubiquitous, and juries
are permitted to consider a vast array of character evidence, such as
prior crimes 2 or subsequent conduct,"2 that would otherwise be
117. See Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 950 (1983) (observing that unlike the guilt
phase, "[i]n fixing a penalty.... there is no similar 'central issue' from which the jury's
attention may be diverted." Once eligibility is established, "the jury then is free to
consider a myriad of factors to determine whether or not death is the appropriate
punishment.") (quoting California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1008 (1983)).
118. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 900 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Indeed,
the Court's embrace of offender-based sentencing focusing on character elevates future
dangerousness to a high rank in sentencing concerns, since, as the Court recently
conceded, evidence of dangerous character is also logically demonstrative of
"'characteristic' future dangerousness." Kelly v. South Carolina, 534 U.S. 246, 254 (2002).
119. See Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 178 (1988) (plurality opinion) (rejecting
claim that the Texas death penalty statute provided an inadequate vehicle for jury
consideration of evidence of the defendant's mitigating evidence as a reflection of his
"character," because "the jury was surely free to weigh and evaluate petitioner's
disciplinary record as it bore on his 'character' - that is, his 'character' as measured by his
likely future behavior").
120. Zant, 462 U.S. at 885.
121. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Thompson, 62 P.3d 823, 841 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (noting
that sentencing inquiry into future dangerousness
makes relevant a broad range of evidence that is probative of whether a
defendant is likely to engage in dangerous criminal conduct in the future,
including evidence of a defendant's entire previous criminal history (including
nonviolent crimes); evidence of the defendant's unadjudicated prior bad acts;
and, most pertinent here, evidence of the defendant's previous 'bad character').
122. Zant, 462 U.S. at 887. Of course, states are permitted to, and do, restrict the scope
of aggravating evidence that may be heard by the sentencer. See, e.g., Barclay v. Florida,
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precluded under traditional rules of evidence for criminal trials.
1 24
a. Jurek and the Prioritization of Incapacitation
Not coincidentally, the state's right to focus on the
dangerousness of the defendant's character was affirmed the same
day the Court first articulated the principle of individual
consideration in Woodson." In Jurek v. Texas, 26 the Court dispensed
with a challenge to the constitutionality of a death penalty procedure
that allows death sentences to turn on predicted future
dangerousness. Writing for the plurality, Justice Stevens defended
Texas's death penalty scheme, which places special emphasis on the
question of future dangerousness.1 27 According to Stevens, the future
dangerousness inquiry mandated by the Texas death penalty statute
was unremarkable. Stevens reasoned that juror evaluations of future
dangerousness in capital sentencing were not distinguishable from a
judge's prediction of the defendant's future conduct at a bail hearing,
that future conduct was at issue at any sentencing determination, and
that such predictions undergirded the parole system. Thus, Stevens
concluded, there was no constitutional bar to future dangerousness in
a capital sentencing procedure."
The logic of the arguments made by Stevens in Jurek, and
reaffirmed in later cases, 29 reflects the Court's early embrace of MPC-
style rehabilitative and incapacitative goals in its procedural approach
463 U.S. 939, 956 (1983) (finding no constitutional error where trial court allows
consideration of aggravating evidence of prior non-violent crimes deemed impermissible
by state law).
123. Skipper v. S. Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1986).
124. See CHARLES MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 190 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 2d ed. 1972) (detailing specific instances of
misconduct not usually admissible to prove bad character); FED. R. EVID. 404(b)
("Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show action in conformity therewith.").
125. 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
126. 428 U.S. at 275.
127. Texas's capital sentencing scheme requires the jury to determine, before a death
sentence is permitted, that (1) the killing was deliberate, and (2) that it is probable that the
defendant "would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing
threat to society." See 'TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071, § 2(b) (Vernon Supp.
2004).
128. Jurek, 428 U.S at 274-276.
129. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992,
1002-03 (1983); cf. Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 369 (1993) (holding that instruction on
future dangerousness based on probability of violence allowed adequate consideration of
defendant's youth as mitigating factor).
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to capital sentencing. After all, the sole purpose of a bail hearing is to
determine whether incapacitation is necessary to protect society from
the predicted dangerousness, or predicted flight risk, of the
defendant. A bail hearing, however, does not purport to resolve the
underlying merits: what, if any, punishment the defendant deserves
for his conduct. Yet a capital sentencing procedure that turns, in
whole or in part, on predictions of future dangerousness necessarily
privileges the incapacitative function over other penal purposes.130
b. The Pervasive Influence of Dangerous Character
With the Court placing its imprimatur on future dangerousness as
a basis to impose capital punishment, most states, as well as the
federal government followed suit.' At present, a defendant's future
dangerousness is a statutory component in the majority of death
penalty jurisdictions. Of the thirty-eight jurisdictions that maintain
the death penalty, twenty-one make "future dangerousness" a
statutory aggravating factor.'32 Three states expressly predicate death
sentences on the future dangerousness of the defendant. 3 In Texas,
the jury must expressly find that the defendant poses a risk of future
130. Stevens's other examples provide no greater logical support for the continued
justification of allowing sentencing determinations to focus on future dangerousness.
They do, however, demonstrate the extent to which Wechslerian ideals permeated the
Court's reasoning in the aftermath of Furman. First, Wechsler was a great advocate of
indeterminate sentencing, which he believed to be the only civilized method to deal with
convicted persons. The basic ideals animating such a system, however, have increasingly
been rejected in the three decades following Jurek. Congress's institution of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines provides the most visible symbol of that rejection. Indeterminate
sentencing has fallen into disfavor, in part, because of the widely held perception that it
fails to satisfy the retributive purposes of criminal justice. See MODEL PENAL CODE:
SENTENCING REPORT 45 (Apr. 11, 2003), available at
http://www.ali.orglali/ALIPROJ MPCO3.pdf (noting increasing disfavor of sentencing
regimes that rely on indeterminate sentences with substantial authority over actual release
dates vested in corrections officials and parole boards: "[t]here are few spokespersons for
the view that indeterminacy ought to be the preferred institutional arrangement for 21st-
century sentencing structures").
131. A few do not. Mississippi, for example, precludes admission of evidence
regarding future dangerousness. See Balfour v. State, 598 So. 2d 731, 748 (Miss. 1992).
132. See Jonathan R. Sorensen & Rocky L. Pilgrim, Criminology: An Actuarial Risk
Assessment of Violence Posed by Capital Murder Defendants, 90 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1251, 1252 (2000). See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.12(7) (2004)
(recognizing a statutory aggravator if sentencer finds "[t]he existence of a probability that
the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing
threat to society").
133. The states are Texas, Virginia, and Oregon. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 37.071, § 2(b)(1); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (Michie 2004); OR. REV. STAT. §
163.150(1)(b)(B) (2004).
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dangerousness before it may impose a death sentence.'4 In Oregon,
jurors may not sentence a defendant to death unless they expressly
find that "there is a probability that the defendant would commit
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to
society.""'3 In Virginia, jurors are instructed that they may not impose
a sentence of death unless they find either that "there is a probability
that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would
constitute a continuing serious threat to society" or that the
defendant's conduct was "outrageously or wantonly vile.""3 6 Not
surprisingly, researchers report that in these jurisdictions, the fate of
capital defendants "is determined almost entirely by juries'
deliberations on, and emotional responses to," the future
dangerousness inquiry.'37 Even in jurisdictions where the defendant's
future dangerousness is neither the central question nor a statutory
aggravating fact, future dangerousness is routinely argued anyway,"'
and if challenged, is usually held admissible under other statutory
provisions, such as a jurisdiction's catch-all sentencing provision.
Death sentences based on such findings have been affirmed as
constitutionally proper.4 °
The decision to allow the issue of future dangerousness into the
134. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071, § 2(b)-(c).
135. OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150(1)(b)(B).
136. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2.
137. Sorenson & Pilgrim, supra note 132, at 1252 n.8-9 (citing James W. Marquart et
al., Gazing into the Crystal Ball: Can Jurors Accurately Predict Dangerousness in Capital
Cases?, 23 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 449, 463 (1989); Sally Constanzo & Mark Constanzo, Life
or Death Decisions: An Analysis of Capital Jury Decision Making Under the Special Issues
Sentencing Framework, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 151 (1994)).
138. See, e.g., Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 149 n.2 (1998) (reversing the ninth
circuit's affirmation of a grant of habeas corpus and remanding case to trial court where in
sentencing phase of California murder trial, prosecutor told jury that defendant "has
already demonstrated what he is capable of doing on numerous occasions to each and
every one of us .... He is manipulative, he is dangerous to all of us."). California permits
a prosecutor to comment on dangerousness, but prohibits expert testimony to establish it.
See People v. Bell, 778 P.2d 129, 156-57 (Cal. 1989); People v. Murtishaw, 631 P.2d 446,
466 (Cal. 1981) (barring expert testimony).
139. See, e.g., State v. Arguelles, 63 P.3d 731, 758-59 (Utah 2003) (holding that
evidence related to defendant's probability of future violence was legitimately considered
under death penalty scheme that directed jury to consider "any other facts in aggravation
or mitigation of the penalty that the court considers relevant to the sentence").
140. In Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242,246 (1976), for example, one of the aggravating
factors upon which defendant's death sentence was based was that "the petitioner has the
propensity to commit murder." Future dangerousness is not a statutory aggravating
circumstance in Florida. See Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 957 (1983) (citing Proffitt,
428 U.S. at 246).
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sentencing proceeding has been enormously consequential. A review
of the cases confirms that the state's ability to present character
evidence collateral to the circumstances of the crime for which the
defendant is being sentenced is virtually unlimited. Although a
finding of future dangerousness may be based solely on the criminal
acts committed, 4' it also may be drawn from a broad search of the
defendant's history, background, character, and pre- and post-crime
conduct. Evidence used to obtain death sentences, without objection
by the Supreme Court, includes the defendant's criminal record,'
juvenile criminal record, past aggressive conduct," unproved prior
bad acts,'145 requests for psychiatric treatment,'
46 bad reputation,4 7
prison behavior,48 prison escapes, 49 probation violations,5 ° alleged
"propensity" to commit murder,' lack of remorse, 2 and "general
moral character.'
53
Based on such evidence, jurors are often asked to make strained
inferences about the dangerousness posed by the defendant. In
Skipper v. South Carolina, for instance, the prosecutor placed special
141. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 74 S.W.3d 868, 870 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (holding that
circumstances of murder alone may warrant affirmative answer to future dangerousness
special issue, thereby supporting imposition of death penalty).
142. Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36, 41 (2001); Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 244
(considering a prior conviction for breaking and entering); Barclay, 463 U.S. 939 at 956
(considering a nonviolent criminal record); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 887 (1982)
(considering prior criminal record highly relevant to individual background and
character).
143. Baldwin v. Alabama, 472 U.S. 372, 376 (1985).
144. Shafer, 532 U.S. at 41.
145. Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 161 (2000) (introducing evidence at
sentencing of numerous alleged crimes committed as part of crime spree culminating in
crime of murder, for which he was convicted).
146. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 246 (detailing defendant's confession to doctor that he had an
uncontrollable desire to kill and also his request for treatment to overcome such desire).
147. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 266; Barefoot, 463 U.S at 918-919 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
148. Kelly v. South Carolina, 534 U.S. 246, 248-49 (2002); Shafer, 532 U.S. at 41.
Evidence of good prison conduct, of course, is also relevant as a mitigating factor and the
cannot be precluded at trial. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5 (1986).
149. Kelly, 534 U.S. at 248; Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 918-19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
150. Shafer, 532 U.S. at 41.
151. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 246 (holding that admission as aggravating factor that
defendant allegedly had a "propensity to commit murder," though not consistent with
Florida law, was not constitutional error).
152. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 464 (1981); Guevara v. State, 97 S.W.3d 579, 581
(Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
153. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 886 n.22 (1983) (citing Fair v. State, 268 S.E.2d
316, 323 (Ga. 1980)).
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emphasis in his closing argument that the defendant "had kicked the
bars of his cell following his arrest. ' 15 4 In Johnson v. Texas, the state
introduced evidence showing, inter alia, that the 19-year-old
defendant had, in seventh grade, cut a schoolmate with a piece of
glass and stabbed another with a pencil."' Some character-related
evidence consists of hearsay or other types of evidence that are
markedly less reliable than evidence allowed at the guilt phase.156 In
Gray v. Netherland, the prosecutor used hearsay statements made by
the defendant to, inter alia, fellow inmates regarding other uncharged
offenses. 57
Not only* is this evidence often unreliable, it can be highly
inflammatory.' In Gray, the trial court allowed the prosecutor to
introduce graphic photographs, including the burned bodies of
victims, autopsy reports and photographs, and the testimony of the
state medical examiner who performed the autopsies, all related to a
separate and unrelated crime for which defendant had not been, and
never was, charged. 9
Prominent critics of the Court's rigorous protection of
defendants' right to introduce mitigation evidence have not
distributed their critiques with an even hand. Justice Scalia, for
example, has been highly critical of the Court's rigorous restrictions
on State attempts to regulate or circumscribe mitigating evidence
proffered by defendants. In Penry v. Lynaugh, he complained bitterly
that:
The Court today demands.., a scheme that simply dumps
before the jury all sympathetic factors bearing upon the
defendant's background and character, and the circumstances
154. 476 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring). Although the Court reversed
because of the trial court's exclusion of corresponding evidence of good prison behavior,
no one suggested that the State's reliance on this testimony was in any way improper.
155. 509 U.S. 350, 356 (1993).
156. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 536 (2003) (noting cases permitting
introduction at capital sentencing hearing of hearsay evidence that would be inadmissible
at trial).
157. 518 U.S. 152, 156-58 (1996) (noting that this evidence was introduced "as evidence
of petitioner's future dangerousness").
158. Of course, the admission of hearsay evidence (as mitigating evidence) might also
be constitutionally required, under the Locken principle, in which its admission may
benefit the defendant. See, e.g., Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (reversing death
sentence where trial judge refused to admit hearsay statement of co-participant in murder
admitting responsibility for the murder). Justice Rehnquist decried the admission of
mitigating hearsay evidence as "another step toward embalming the law of evidence in the
Due Process Clause." Id. at 98 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
159. 518 U.S. at 174 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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of the offense .... The Court seeks to dignify this by calling it a
process that calls for a 'reasoned moral response,' - but reason
has nothing to do with it, the Court having eliminated the
structure that required reason. It is an unguided, emotional
'moral response' that the Court -demands to be allowed - an
outpouring of personal reaction to all the circumstances of a
defendant's life and personality, an unfocused sympathy.'w
But Scalia fails to note that the same critique can be levied at the
unfettered aggravation inquiry. In giving free rein to the state to
prove, not only that the defendant is dangerous, but that his character
is so "defective" that only the most vengeful response is warranted,
the entire nature of the prosecutor's role at the sentencing proceeding
is geared toward stirring an unfocused emotional response in the
sentencer: the thirst for vengeance.
c. Diagnosis or Damnation?
The impact of the evidence of a defendant's dangerous character
is greatly accentuated by the additional practice of admitting expert
testimony to prove it. Expert testimony on future dangerousness
figures largest, of course, in states where a finding of future
dangerousness is a prerequisite to a death sentence, but even where
future dangerousness is merely one of a number of statutory
aggravating factors,"' expert testimony is frequently relied upon.
Plainly, expert testimony regarding future dangerousness is an
extremely potent prosecutorial tool. When a defendant is confronted
with a well-credentialed medical professional willing to testify, to a
"scientific certitude," that defendant will kill again if given the
chance, the prospect for countering such testimony through cross-
examination or by putting on dissenting experts is slight. 2 The Fifth
Circuit noted that one psychiatrist, Dr. Clay Griffith, has appeared in
twenty-two cases with published opinions, and testified in each that
the defendant posed a risk of future dangerousness.'63 Another well-
160. 492 U.S. at 359 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), quoted in
Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1150-51 (1993).
161. See Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36 (2001).
162. Predictions by experts at this purported level of accuracy are common. See, e.g.,
Tumblin v. State, No. 74097, 2003 WL 1821467, at *2 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 19, 2003)
(unpublished opinion) ("State's expert testified that it was ninety to one hundred per cent
probable that appellant would commit other acts of violence."); Gardner v. Johnson, 247
F.3d 551, 554 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting that State's expert, a Dr. Clay Griffith, testified "with
'one hundred percent certainty' that, in his professional opinion," the defendant "would
'commit violent acts in the future,' he was 'super dangerous, and [he would] kill [again]
given any chance at all."').
163. Flores v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 456, 461 n.6 (5th Cir. 2000) (Garza, J., concurring).
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known forensic psychologist, James P. Grigson, has testified in
hundreds of death penalty proceedings, and routinely makes such
predictive claims." Indeed, because of his great effectiveness as a
testifying witness, Dr. Grigson has earned the titles "Dr. Death" and
"the hanging psychiatrist."'1 6  A prediction from Dr. Grigson that
defendant is likely to hurt or kill again in the future is a virtual death
sentence in itself.16 Moreover, often not one but several witnesses
will take the stand to testify concerning the defendant's future
dangerousness. In Penry v. Johnson, for example, three psychiatrists,
along with four additional prison officials, testified that the mentally-
retarded defendant Penry was dangerous. 167  On the basis of such
testimony, Penry was twice sentenced by a Texas jury to death.
The use of expert testimony at trial to establish the
dangerousness of the defendant's character, however, is in one sense
consistent with Wechsler's hope that criminal sentencing might be
founded on "scientific principles."'" Although Wechsler was far from
naive about the abilities of psychologists and psychiatrists to correctly
predict and diagnose future dangerousness, he nonetheless was a firm
believer that mental health professionals could provide important
insight into the character determinations relevant to sentencing
decisions.9  In another sense, however, and as numerous
commentators have observed, the admission of expert testimony to
"prove" future dangerous is anything but scientific in a more rigorous,
Daubert-like.7 ° sense of the term.
1 71
164. See id. at 467 n.16 (noting "hundreds" of cases in which Grigson testified, and
discussing Grigson's testimony in case of "Randall Dale Adams, where Grigson testified
that he was one hundred percent certain Adams would kill again, and after it was revealed
that the evidence against Adams was falsified by the police, Adams was released as
innocent.").
165. See Gardner v. Johnson, 247 F.3d 551, 556 n.6 (5th Cir. 2001) (observing that "Dr.
Grigson's extensive participation in capital punishment cases has earned him notoriety,
including the titles 'Dr. Death' and 'the hanging psychiatrist."').
166. Dr. Grigson's methods were famously discussed by journalist Ron Rosenbaum in
an article published in Vanity Fair. See Ron Rosenbaum, Travels With Dr. Death, VANITY
FAIR, May 1990, at 140.
167. 532 U.S. 782,795-96 (2001).
168. Wechsler, supra note 22, at 1103 (criticizing common law for posing "questions
that a scientist can neither regard as meaningful or relevant nor answer on his own
scientific terms...").
169. Id. (arguing that "though the law purports to be concerned with the control of
specified behavior, it rejects or does not fully use the aid that modern science can
afford.").
170. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993) (for admission of
expert scientific testimony, court must determine whether proposed expert's testimony
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B. Weighing Character Evidence to Evaluate the Offender
Not only does the MPC's offender-based approach require that
all character-related aggravating and mitigating factors sought to be
introduced by either party be presented to the, sentencer, it also
requires that they be weighed, and weighed against each other, in
some systematic or rational manner to produce fair sentencing
results.'72 Although most death penalty states follow the MPC's
prescriptions, more or less, for enumerating statutory aggravators and
mitigators and providing the jury the final discretion to reach a
disposition after considering the evidence, not all states adhere to that
model.' Some states expressly require sentencers to weigh
aggravating and mitigating circumstances against each other.'74
Others require the sentencer to find at least one statutory aggravator,
and then allow the jury to consider all of the evidence (including
statutory and non-statutory aggravating evidence, and all mitigating
evidence) to reach a sentence. 7 Nonetheless, the Court's individual
consideration cases and its approval of future dangerousness evidence
assures, in fact, that no death sentence is imposed unless the
sentencer has weighed the mitigating evidence against whatever
evidence of future dangerousness is adduced by the state, in some
fashion.
17 6
reflects valid "scientific knowledge," and if so, whether testimony "will assist the trier of
fact to understand or determine a fact in issue.").
171. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING REPORT 32 (Apr. 11, 2003),
available at http://www.ali.org/ali/ALIPROJMPCO3.pdf (noting substantial body of
research performed since 1962 strongly underscoring that "it is difficulty to predict future
serious criminal behavior with acceptable levels of accuracy.").
172. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
173. Texas, for example, has required jurors to answer two or three "special issues"
which solely determine whether a death sentence will be imposed. See TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 37.071.
174. The "weighing" states include Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South
Dakota, and Tennessee. See Stephen Hornbuckle, Note, Capital Sentencing Procedure: A
Lethal Oddity in the Supreme Court's Case Law, 73 TEX L. REV. 441,448 n.38 (1994).
175. The "non-weighing" states include Arizona, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, Washington,
and Wyoming. See Hornbuckle, supra note 174 at 447 n.35.
176. See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1009 n.23 (1983) (quoting MODEL PENAL
CODE § 210.6 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) in support of holding that California statute
requiring jury be informed that the governor retains authority to commute sentence of life
imprisonment without possibility of parole to term of imprisonment with possibility of
parole); id. at 1008-09 n.22 (all information, including speculative information regarding
the "desirability of the defendant's release into society is simply one matter that enters
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As a result, in a typical sentencing proceeding the sentencer will
engage in an extremely broad inquiry in which an almost limitless
variety of "good" and "bad" character evidence along with the
circumstances of the crime, its impact upon the victim, and expert
testimony about the defendant's propensities are considered. 77
Although the sentencer is then directed to weigh the evidence in
some fashion, the guidance given to the jury about how to weigh the
evidence is extremely limited, and indeed, may constitutionally be
absent altogether.78
Although the weighing paradigm assists the capital sentencer to
conduct a broad evaluation of the defendant's "character," it is far
from clear that it ensures that, as a result of that inquiry, the least
culpable offenders are spared execution.79 Indeed, as I will discuss
below, the tradeoff practically ensures that persons with diminished
culpability will regularly be sentenced to death despite the fact that
others who are more culpable are not.
In short, the MPC-based sentencing procedures the Supreme
Court has approved, which require the sentencer to consider a
virtually limitless assortment of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, and to "weigh" them against each other, are deeply
infused with Wechsler's non-retributive, character-focused,
sentencing philosophy. As the prominence of retributive theory
grows, however, the non-retributive aspects of the MPC capital-
sentencing model look increasingly dated and in need of change.
What the drafters of the current ALl Plan for Revision have said with
respect to the Code's general sentencing theory is equally true of the
into the weighing process.").
177. See Erica Beecher-Monas, The Epistemology of Prediction: Future Dangerousness
Testimonay and Intellectual Due Process, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 353, 357 (2003)
(describing capital penalty trials as "an evidentiary free-for-all").
178. The Court has rejected the argument that the sentencer must be given specific
guidance on how to weigh aggravating factors. See Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967,
978-80 (1994) (holding that sentencer may be given "unbridled discretion in determining
whether the death penalty should be imposed after it has found that the defendant is a
member of the class made eligible for that penalty." (quoting Zant v. Stevens, 462 U.S.
862, 875 (1988)) (internal quote omitted).
179. Researchers for the multi-state Capital Juror Project have found that "topics
related to the defendant's dangerousness should he ever return to society (including the
possibility and timing of such a return) are second only to the crime itself in the attention
they receive during the jury's penalty phase deliberations." See John H. Blume et al.,
Future Dangerousness in Capital Cases: Always "At Issue," 86 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 404
(2001).
180. This is entirely consistent with the approach advocated by Wechsler and Michael.
See Wechsler & Michael II, supra note 15, at 1301-02.
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death penalty: the "supposition that retributive considerations should
not play any important role" in the structure of capital sentencing
procedures is simply "unworkable."18'
III. Retribution as the Primary Justification for the Death
Penalty
The ALI's ongoing effort to revise the MPC's sentencing
provisions to more fully reflect retributivist principles is, with respect
to capital sentencing, in some senses a game of "catch-up." While the
Court has developed a death-penalty jurisprudence that follows the
MPC's offender-based model as to the acceptable form of sentencing
procedures, it never has embraced the non-retributivist assumptions
underlying the MPC as a matter of capital penal theory.83 In Gregg v.
Georgia, the plurality pointedly rejected the idea that retributive
principles should, or could, be excised from capital punishment. As
the plurality observed: "It is a mistake to consider the objects of
punishment as being deterrent or reformative or preventive and
nothing else.... The truth is that some crimes are so outrageous that
society insists on adequate punishment, because the wrongdoer
deserves it, irrespective of whether it is a deterrent or not.''8
The Court consistently has acknowledged the importance of
retributive justifications for capital punishment."" As the plurality
noted in Gregg, "the instinct for retribution is part of the nature of
man, and channeling that instinct in the administration of criminal
181. Reitz, supra note 7, at 549.
182. See Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 92, at 119 (noting that MPC commentators
now assert that MPC approach to capital sentencing establishes "a 'paradigm of
constitutional permissibility"' (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 cmt. at 171 (Official
Draft and Revised Commentaries, Part I 1980)).
183. To say that the basic orientation of the MPC is utilitarian is not to say that the
retributive ideals did not, to some extent, find their way into the Code. As Professor
Dressier has observed, the MPC's "drafters were enamored of utilitarian goals, but they
were also cognizant of the need for retributive limits to them." Joshua Dressler,
Reflections on Excusing Wrongdoers: Moral Theory, New Excuses and the Model Penal
Code, 19 RUTGERS L. J. 671, 692 (1987). This is entirely consistent with Wechsler and
Michael's views on the appropriate interplay of utilitarian ideals and persistent retributive
influences. See Wechsler & Michael II, supra note 14, at 1266-68 (noting "sound reasons
for limiting the extent to which actual offenders may be sacrificed for the purpose of
deterring potential offenders.").
184. 428 U.S. 153, 184 n.30 (1976) (plurality opinion) (quoting ROYAL COMMISSION
ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, December 1, 1949, 207 (1950)).
185. Id. at 183-84 (Capital sentence represents "an expression of the community's
belief that certain crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that the only
adequate response may be the penalty of death.").
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justice serves an important purpose in promoting the stability of
society governed by law."'"
To be sure, the Court professes agnosticism as to the ultimate
justification or purpose of capital punishment.' 7  Nonetheless, the
Court's language in its death penalty cases reflects an acute
recognition of the distinctively moral nature of the death penalty
determination.188 Indeed, if anything, since Furman and Gregg, the
Court has shown an increasing preference in its capital
jurisprudence '89 for retribution-based approaches over others.'"
Although the Court consistently has also acknowledged the
deterrence function of capital punishment,' because of the lack of
empirical evidence that the death penalty actually works as a
deterrent, '92 many on the Court have expressed skepticism that the
186. Id. at 183 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972) (Stewart, J.,
concurring)); id. at 184 n.30 ("Punishment is the way in which society expresses its
denunciation of wrongdoing: and, in order to maintain respect for law, it is essential that
the punishment inflicted for grave crimes should adequately reflect the revulsion felt by
the great majority of citizens for them.").
187. See, e.g., Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 510 (1995) ("What purpose is served by
capital punishment and how a State should implement its capital punishment scheme - to
the extent that those questions involve only policy issues - are matters over which we, as
judges, have no jurisdiction.").
188. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 280 (1998) (Breyer, J., concurring)
("The imposition of a penalty of death must be 'directly related to the personal culpability
of the criminal defendant,' and 'reflect a reasoned moral response to the defendant's
background, character, and crime."' (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis in original)).
189. In non-capital cases, the Court has pointedly rejected applying the same
retributive principles. For instance, in reviewing the constitutional proportionality of
California's three-strikes laws, the Court refused to hold that a fifty-year sentence for
stealing $150 worth of golf clubs violated the Eighth Amendment. In reaching that
conclusion, the Court expressly acknowledged the legitimacy of the state's purpose of
incapacitating dangerous recidivists. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003) ("Our
traditional deference to legislative policy choices finds a corollary in the principle that the
Constitution 'does not mandate adoption of any one penological theory.' A sentence can
have a variety of justifications, such as incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, or
rehabilitation." (internal citation omitted)).
190. Harris, 513 U.S. at 517-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at
183-84 (plurality opinion)); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 184 (plurality opinion).
191. In Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002), the Court, quoting Gregg, 428 U.S.
at 183, "identified 'retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders'
as the social purposes served by the death penalty."
192. In fact, such doubts about the deterrent value of the death penalty date back to
the dawn of the contemporary era of capital punishment. In Furman, Justice White
accepted the theoretical underpinnings of the deterrence argument, but argued that the
penalty was enforced too rarely to work as a deterrent. 408 U.S. at 312. "[Tlhe death
penalty, unless imposed with sufficient frequency, will make little contribution to deterring
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death penalty can be justified based on deterrence arguments alone. '93
Although not every Justice has accepted retribution as the best, or
even as a permissible, justification for executing criminals,"94 several
Justices have expressly acknowledged -that retribution is the only
supportable basis for the death penalty.' 95
As will be discussed below,' 96 in several important capital cases,
the Court has given preference to basic retributive norms in favor of
deterrence and incapacitation justifications of capital punishment.'97
those crimes for which it may be exacted." Id.; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 184-85 (characterizing
the results of statistical attempts to evaluate the deterrent effect of the death penalty as
"inconclusive").
193. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 614-15 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing
that "retribution provides the main justification for capital punishment" in light of
inconclusive evidence that death penalty furthers any deterrent purpose, and obvious
inapplicability of rehabilitation arguments); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 480 (1984)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (deterrence rationale provides weak support for capital
punishment); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 624-28 (1978) (White, J., concurring in
judgment) (deterrence argument unavailable for one who neither kills nor intends to kill);
Furman, 408 U.S. at 301-02 (Brennan, J., concurring) (unverifiable that the death penalty
deters more effectively than life imprisonment); id. at 345-55, & nn.124-25 (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (deterrence rationale unsupported by the evidence).
194. Justice Brennan, for one, rejected retribution. Indeed, Brennan's views regarding
retribution were closely aligned with Wechsler's and the MPC drafters'. See, e.g., Furman,
408 U.S. at 305 ("[O]ur society wishes to prevent crime; we have no desire to kill criminals
simply to get even with them"). Justice Marshall also concluded that "retribution for its
own sake is improper." Id. at 345 (Marshall, J., concurring).
195. See, e.g., Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2527 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
("[T]he Eighth Amendment demands the use of a jury in capital sentencing because a
death sentence must reflect a community-based judgment that the sentence constitutes
proper retribution."); Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 498 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring)
("We have recognized that 'capital punishment is an expression of society's moral outrage
at particularly offensive conduct' and that a process for 'channeling th[e] instinct [for
retribution] in the administration of criminal justice serves an important purpose in
promoting the stability of a society governed by law."' (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183
(plurality opinion))); Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 480 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("In the context of capital felony cases.... the question whether the
death sentence is an appropriate, nonexcessive response to the particular facts of the case
will depend on the retribution justification.").
196. See infra section III.B.
197. The prioritization of retribution over deterrence is nowhere better exemplified
than in the Court's cases rejecting mandatory death penalty schemes. Despite the fact that
mandatory schemes most plainly obviate the risk of racial or other bias in jury sentencing,
the Court consistently has rejected mandatory death sentences because of their failure to
accord sufficient individualized respect for individuals, and this despite the fact that
mandatory schemes would seem to provide a stronger and surer deterrent than
discretionary schemes. See, e.g., Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 480 (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (noting that mandatory sentences have been rejected as
unconstitutional despite fact that "a legislature may rationally conclude that mandatory
capital punishment will have a deterrent effect for a given class of aggravated crimes
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First, however, it will be useful to more fully develop the contours of
the theory that underlies those norms.
A. Retribution and the Death Penalty
Broadly speaking, retributive theory justifies imposition of
punishment in terms of the offender's moral desert. 9' The Supreme
Court has characterized retribution as "the interest in seeing that the
offender gets his 'just deserts. '"" '  A retributive approach to
punishment seeks to proportion the punitive response to the gravity
of the offense, with gravity, from a retributive viewpoint, measured by
the injury caused by the offender (or that the actor subjectively
believed would be caused),' plus the culpability"' of the offender in
causing the injury.22
significantly greater than would discretionary capital sentencing."). Indeed, in Sumner v.
Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987), the Court rejected a mandatory death penalty even where the
deterrence argument was at its peak: where the defendant already was serving a life
sentence. Even in these circumstances, the Court reasoned, "a departure from the
individualized capital-sentencing doctrine is not justified and cannot be reconciled with
the demands of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." 483 U.S. at 78.
198. See, e.g., Furman, 408 U.S. at 304 (Brennan, J., concurring) (observing that in the
context of the death penalty, retribution "means that criminals are put to death because
they deserve it"); MICHAEL S. MOORE, A TAXONOMY OF PURPOSES OF PUNISHMENT, IN
LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP 235 (Cambridge Univ. Press
1984) (defining retributivism as "the view that punishment is justified by the desert of the
offender").
199. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002).
200. Different approaches to retributivism assign different emphases to actual harm.
Some posit that retribution's function as a form of "payback" must be calibrated to the
harm actually resulting from the offender's acts. Others place more emphasis on the
blameworthiness of the actor's intentions, and thus argue that punishment should be
proportioned to the harm intended alone. Every version of retributivism, however, makes
either intended or actual harm one of the essential determinants of moral
blameworthiness.
201. Culpability - the blameworthiness of the offender's conduct - is measured by
evaluating the actor's "intentions, expectations, and actions." Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S.
376, 407-08 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
202. See In re Stanford, 537 U.S. 968, 969 (2002) (noting that "the gravity of the
offense," should be "understood to include not only the injury caused, but also the
defendant's culpability" (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983)), reh'g denied,
537 U.S. 1097 (2003)); JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 216-17
(2d ed. 1960) (noting that gravity of criminal offenses may vary depending on the extent of
harm to individual and community and the degree of moral culpability of the offender).
"Harm" can be subdivided into two separate components, actual and intended harm, both
of which have some independent conceptual standing. See, e.g., Samuel H. Pillsbury,
Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal Punishment, 74 CORNELL L. REV.
655, 662 (1989) (arguing that there are three basic components to deserved punishment:
"harm, motive-intentionality and autonomy").
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Because retributive punishment is based on the belief that
punishment is imposed on persons as a response that has been
"earned," it is fundamentally backward-looking in nature, unlike
utilitarian theories' 3  This backward-looking orientation places
important limits on the types of considerations that properly may be
invoked in determining what punishment is "deserved."2' As the
Court has observed, where a defendant is incapacitated because he is
deemed to be dangerous, the law or sentence on which that
incapacitative treatment is based is not retributive, because "it does
not affix culpability for prior criminal conduct."2 °5
1. Evaluating Harm in Capital Sentencing
A basic assumption underlying fair sentencing is that the amount
of harm caused by an offender is central to the degree of punishment
that is deserved." There are two ways to view the harm inquiry in
capital cases from the perspective of retribution. First, one might
seek to establish a minimum quantum of harm that must have been
caused or intended as a precondition to the conclusion that death is
"justly deserved." Such an approach cleaves to the literal sense of lex
talionis. Death is not a proportionate penalty, under such view, for
any crime that does not inflict an "equivalent" amount of harm on its
victim or victims, however such equivalence is measured.'
Alternatively, one might attempt to rank or order the harmfulness of
an actor's conduct and intentions in comparison with other categories
of crimes or other particular instances of crimes within the same
category, and apply the "ultimate punishment" only to those
responsible for crimes falling into the highest category, or falling at
the most harmful end of the range within a particular category.'l In
203. See Mary Ellen Gale, Retribution, Punishment, and Death, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
973, 999 (1985).
204. See, e.g., LEO KATZ ET AL., FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 63 (Oxford Univ.
Press 1999) ("Retributive desert is based on what the offender has done, and with what
culpability.").
205. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 362 (1997) (providing for civil commitment of
persons who, due to mental abnormality or personality disorder, are likely to commit
sexually predatory acts).
206. See CESARE BECCARIA, supra note 16, at 24 ("[T]he true measure of crimes is,
namely, harm to society....").
207. As Blackstone approvingly observed, "[t]he Mosaical law reads, that 'whoso
sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed."' WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ON LAW 832 (Bernard C. Gavit ed., Washington Law
Book Co. 1941) (1769).
208. See, e.g., Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 37 (1984) (identifying two types of
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either case, measurement of the harmfulness of conduct is essential to
determine the gravity of the offense.
In fact, extraordinarily harmful conduct is recognized as relevant
to the penalty decision in the MPC capital sentencing provisions and
in virtually all death penalty schemes. Homicidal conduct that creates
a risk of or actually causes the death of more than one person,2°9 that
involves physical torture of the victim, 210 that is accompanied by other
criminal acts such as rape, robbery, or arson,211 or that is committed in
an "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel" manner 212 all describe
criminal conduct that causes extraordinary harm. Empirical research
also suggests that particularly "vile" killings that involve multiple
victims, sexual abuse, or torture are among the most frequent types of
killings to be punished by death.213 Aggravating circumstances that
measure gravity by identifying such circumstances properly
distinguish critical aspects of more and less grave offenses. The
admission of victim impact statements and testimony is predicated on
a broad definition of harm, one. that measures the secondary impact
of the actor's conduct as well as its immediate results.1
2. Evaluating Culpability
Of course, whether the defendant's offense is sufficiently grave
to justify the death penalty, and if so, whether it is sufficiently grave
to place it among the worst offenses is not solely limited to the
quantum of harm caused or intended by the defendant's acts.
Inextricably bound up with that estimation is an evaluation of the
defendant's culpability for engaging in the conduct or bringing about
the harm. Even great harms may not deserve severe punishment if, in
causing them to occur, the actor was not truly blameworthy for his
proportionality review: review for inherent disproportionality and comparative analysis
for "unequal" sentencing outcomes).
209. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(3)(b)-(d) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
210. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(1)(h) (Law. Co-op 2001).
211. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(3)(e).
212. See, e.g., id. § 210.6(3)(h).
213. Arnold Barnett, Some Distribution Patterns for the Georgia Death Sentence, 18
U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 1327, 1341 (1985).
214. The extent to which a defendant is culpable for the harms caused to family and
friends of the victim, however, depends on the foreseeability of their occurrence. The
tendency to view murders involving the dismemberment or desecration of the body as
especially abhorrent also might be understood as a reflection of the community's
evaluation of the harm caused to the community's moral standards or notions of decency
and respect.
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conduct."5 Accordingly, under a retributive sentencing theory, only
those offenses in which both the greatest harms are caused and in
which the offender deliberately intended to cause them deserve the
severest punishment.16 Thus, the question of what constitutes an
actor's "just deserts" requires consideration of the actor's culpability
in causing the injury.217
Culpability, of course, has long been recognized as an essential
attribute of criminal liability, and one that guided the common law
treatment of homicide. As Blackstone's commentary on murder
suggests, "consciousness of doing wrong" and "discernment between
good and evil" are necessary predicates of guilt. 18 The common law
and statutory law concepts of malice aforethought, premeditation,
and deliberation all represent an attempt to discern the degree of the
actor's "consciousness of doing wrong., 219 Indeed, at least as far back
as the seventeenth century, "malice in fact" was understood to signify
"a deliberate intention of doing some corporal harm to the person of
another.
221
The central feature of the retributive conception of culpability is
the opportunity or capacity to exercise choice.22' Because culpability
215. See, e.g., Stephen P. Garvey, "As the Gentle Rain From Heaven": Mercy in Capital
Sentencing, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 989, 1022 (1996) ("The more culpable a capital
defendant is for his conduct, the more deserving he is of death.").
216. For example, deliberate mercy killings are less grave because they cause less
harm, given the victim's impaired condition. Provoked killings, on the other hand, are less
grave because defendants are less culpable, as will be discussed below. Arnold Loewy
argues that a third consideration, which he calls "dangerousness," should also be weighed
in determining the true gravity of criminal conduct. By dangerousness, Loewy is referring
not to the actor's character or "future dangerousness," as the term is discussed in this
Article. Rather, he is referring to the potential for harm implicit, or foreseeable, in the
offending act. See Arnold H. Loewy, Culpability, Dangerousness, and Harm: Balancing
the Factors on Which Our Criminal Law is Predicated, 66 N.C. L. REV. 283 (1988).
217. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2001) ("[T]he severity of the appropriate
punishment necessarily depends on the culpability of the offender.").
218. Thus, Blackstone explained, both the mentally infirm ("lunatics") and the morally
immature ("infants") presumptively are assumed to lack the necessary capacity, but the
presumption was rebuttable. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 207, at 832.
219. As Blackstone explained, malice aforethought is "any evil design in general, the
dictate of a wicked heart." Id. at 834. An actual killing must accompany the mental state.
Without a killing, there is no crime. Id. at 832.
220. 1 HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROwN 451 (1st ed. 1736) (quoted
in Walter E. Oberer, The Deadly Weapon Doctrine: Common Law Origin, 75 HARV. L.
REV. 1565, 1568 (1962)) (emphasis in original).
221. See, e.g., Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CAL. L. REV. 257 (1987);
Michael S. Moore, Choice, Character, and Excuse, 7 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 29 (1990);
Samuel H. Pillsbury, The Meaning of Deserved Punishment: An Essay on Choice,
Character, and Responsibility, 67 IND. L.J. 719, 722 (1992) ("When we call punishment
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only exists where an individual has acted in a morally blameworthy
fashion, and because no act can be deemed blameworthy if it was not,
in some sense, the product of a free choice, retributive theories of
criminal responsibility impose responsibility only where the choice to
violate the law was made "freely," or "voluntarily. 22 2 Where the
contrary is true, and the criminal act is not the product of the
offender's free choice, the offender is relieved of responsibility.
This principle is reflected in the basic excuses recognized in the
substantive criminal law - insanity, infancy, duress, provocation,
mistake, and involuntary intoxication, 223 each of which evidences that
the offending act was not, in some meaningful sense, the product of
the "free and voluntary choice" of the actor,224 or in Blackstone's
words, as a result of "the want or defect of will. ' '22 Where facts
supporting an affirmative defense are present, but not in such degree
as to relieve the defendant of legal responsibility, retributivism
suggests that the diminishment of choice nonetheless is relevant to
the severity of punishment. As the Court recognized in Penry v.
Lynaugh, any evidence that shows that the defendant had a
diminished ability to "control his impulses or to evaluate the
consequences of his conduct" reduces a defendant's moral culpability,
226
and counsels for a less severe sentence.
The concept of choice can be broken down into three
components. As Joshua Dressler notes: "Free choice' exists if the
actor has the substantial capacity and fair opportunity to: (1)
understand the pertinent facts relating to his conduct; (2) appreciate
that his conduct violates society's moral or legal norms; and (3)
conform his conduct to the law.
227
In other words, before criminal responsibility can fairly be
ascribed to an individual, we must be able to conclude three things:
deserved, we mean that punishment depends on the person's choice to do wrong and not
on the consequences that flow from punishment.").
222. Of course, the concept of free choice or free will is, as a philosophical matter,
highly contested. See, e.g., Pillsbury, supra note 221 ("[T]he first and perhaps hardest
question for any modern theory of deserved punishment is whether free choice is
possible.").
223. See generally, WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 447-448 (4th ed. 2003).
224. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 174 (Oxford Univ.
Press 1968) (arguing that the excuses reflect the "fundamental principle of morality that a
person is not to be blamed for what he has done if he could not help doing it.").
225. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *20 (arguing that "[a]ll the several
pleas and excuses... may be reduced to this single consideration... ").
226. 492 U.S. 302, 322 (1989) (mental retardation and childhood abuse).
227. Dressier, supra note 183, at 701.
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(1) the actor understood what she was doing; (2) the actor understood
that what she was doing was wrong; and (3) the actor could have
acted otherwise. All three conditions must be present before a
wrongdoer can be held blameworthy for her criminal conduct. 21
Most mitigating circumstances enumerated in modern death
penalty statutes track the recognized bases for excusing, justifying or
mitigating criminal conduct: provocation, extreme emotional
disturbance, justification defenses such as self-defense or defense of
others, duress, insanity, and intoxication.229 Such factors all relate to
the basic preconditions of choice: the degree to which the actor
understood the pertinent facts relating to her conduct, appreciated
the moral and legal implications of her conduct, and had the capacity
to conform her conduct to the law.23
In sum, in order to evaluate the defendant's culpability, it is not
228. The analysis called for in the sentencing phase by these retributive principles is
familiar, since each of the three conditions of "choice" is widely understood as a basic
precondition of criminal responsibility. For instance, with respect to the first factor, it is a
longstanding principle of criminal liability that a mistake of fact that negates an element of
a specific-intent offense excuses criminal liability. See LAFAVE, supra note 223, at 281-
300. Similarly, the offender who commits his offense in the mistaken belief that his
conduct was justified has usually been treated under the common law as deserving of less
punishment - and often no punishment at all - where his mistake was "reasonable."
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 214-15 (3d ed. 2001) (noting that
reasonable use of force in self-defense is justified, even if the belief that such use of force
was necessary proves to have been mistaken in fact). The second and third components of
the choice inquiry are equally familiar to the criminal law. Indeed, the defendant's ability
to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct, or to conform his conduct to the law,
merely restates the basic test of criminal responsibility set forth in the M'Naghten and
"irresistible impulse" tests. It is the same test that was adopted by the MPC to determine
an offender's legal responsibility for his criminal conduct. LAFAVE, supra note 223, at
375-92. Defenses such as provocation and "extreme emotional disturbance" reflect the
third aspect of choice, where those defenses turn on a judgment that, where the
defendant's homicidal act was reasonably provoked by the victim's conduct, and thus that
the volitional component of conduct was undermined, less severe punishment is deserved.
229. The MPC, for instance, recognizes that mitigation of sentence is appropriate
where the murder was committed in the following circumstances: (1) while the defendant
was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, (2) under
circumstances which the defendant believed to provide a moral justification or
extenuation for his conduct, (3) where the defendant was an accomplice in a murder
committed by another person and his participation in the homicidal act was relatively
minor, (4) where the defendant acted under duress or under the domination of another
person, and (5) where, at the time of the murder, the capacity of the defendant to
appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness) of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or intoxication.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(4) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). The MPC, as well as
most state jurisdictions, also recognizes that defendant's youth at the time of the crime is a
mitigating factor.
230. Dressier, supra note 183, at 701.
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enough to determine the nature and scope of the harm caused or
intended by the defendant. The sentencer also must evaluate the
degree of "free choice" accompanying the defendant's conduct. Only
then can the sentencer make a meaningful judgment about the gravity
of the offense. As the Court observed in Tison v. Arizona, "the more
purposeful is the criminal conduct, the more serious is the offense,
and, therefore, the more severely it ought to be punished." 1
Importantly, what is pertinent to the issue of culpability is the moral
quality of the choice, not the moral character of the offender. 2
3. A Word About Character and Retribution
This is not to say that all retributivists would agree that character
is irrelevant to punishment.33 In contradistinction to the "choice"
theory of retributivism described above, an alternative type of
retributive theory attempts to avoid the problematic aspects of a pure
choice theory raised by determinists and other critics of the concept
of "free will" by mediating or interpreting the action of the individual
through the "character" of the person who engaged in the offensive
act.234 If choice theories posit "an offender responsible for his act if
and only if it was the product of his free will, '235 character theories
posit that people may not be responsible for acts which flow from
their "character," but that they are responsible for creating or shaping
their character. Character theories view criminal acts as evidence of
the bad character of the offender, and the purpose of punishment as
primarily the reform of or retribution for one's bad character, rather
than merely retribution for one's bad choices.
231. 481 U.S. 137, 156 (1987).
232. The distinction, at times, may be a fine one. Offender-based arguments are
relevant in a choice model to the extent that they relate to the issue of capacity. The
offender who lacks the capacity to make a free and informed choice necessarily cannot be
held to have made such a choice. The route is thus indirect, but the underlying issue
remains the quality of choice rather than the worthiness of the chooser.
233. Some, like George Fletcher, argue that retribution should be understood to
require the sentencer to proportion punishment to his or her evaluation of the defendant's
character. See GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 800 (Little, Brown &
Co. 1978) (arguing that under retributive theory of punishment, "the desert of an offender
is gauged by his character - i.e., the kind of person he is... ").
234. On character theory, see, e.g., Peter Arenella, Character, Choice and Moral
Agency: The Relevance of Character to Our Moral Culpability Judgments, 7 SOC. PHIL. &
POL'Y 59 (1990); Pillsbury, supra note 221; Edmund L. Pincoffs, Legal Responsibility and
Moral Character, 19 WAYNE L. REv. 905 (1973); George Vuoso, Note, Background,
Responsibility and Excuse, 96 YALE L.J. 1661 (1987). For a good summary of the debate
between choice and character theories, see Garvey, supra note 215.
235. Garvey, supra note 215, at 1023.
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To make matters more complex, scholars posit several different
types of character theories. One commentator has identified three
main groups of character theories: causal models, moral capacity
models, and representative action models. 36 Causal models, common
in contemporary sentencing hearings, focus on the causal influences
that predispose certain people to criminal behavior. 37  Common
influences highlighted include socioeconomic background, racial
discrimination, and the defendant's own history of childhood abuse.
Causal character theory holds that because individuals are not
responsible for the conditions in which their moral character was
formed, to the extent that those conditions are particularly
responsible for the formation of bad character tending towards
criminal behavior, that individual is less blameworthy than others
whose characters cannot be attributed to such conditions.238
Moral capacity models represent a second type of character
theory.2 39 Adherents to the moral capacity approach emphasize that
true choice can only exist where the actor has the capacity to make
reasoned moral decisions. Where the character of the individual is
such as to preclude the exercise of moral choice, the offender cannot
be held fully blameworthy for her bad moral choices.
Representative action models provide a third approach to
character theory.2 ° In contrast to causal and capacity models,
representative action models posit that by studying the circumstances
of the offense and the offender, one can reach judgment as to whether
the offense was consistent or inconsistent with the individual's basic
character. Writing for the Seventh Circuit, Judge Posner expressed a
simple version of the representative action model of character theory.
236. Pillsbury, supra note 221, at 732-35.
237. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, "Rotten Social Background": Should the Criminal Law
Recognize a Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation?, 3 LAW & INEQ. 9 (1985).
238. For example, Justice O'Connor is expressing a type of causal character theory
when she asserts "that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a
disadvantaged background, or to emotional and mental problems, may be less culpable
than defendants who have no such excuse." California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., concurring). For a scholarly example of a type of causal character theory,
see Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal
Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 355-56 (1996) (arguing that individuals ought to be
evaluated "not only for making good choices but also for having good character, which
consists in experiencing appropriate rather than inappropriate passions.").
239. See, e.g., Arenella, supra note 234.
240. Probably the most prominent spokesperson for the representative action model of
character theory is George Fletcher. See FLETCHER, supra note 233, at 799 (arguing that
"[t]he distinguishing feature of excusing conditions is that they preclude an inference from
the act to the actor's character").
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At the sentencing hearing of a capital trial, Posner claimed:
What is brought out that will help him is what goes to show that
he is not as 'bad' a person as one might have thought from the
evidence in the guilt phase of the proceeding. What is brought
out that will hurt him is what goes to show that he is, indeed, as
bad a person, or worse, than one might have thought from just
the evidence concerning the crime.
In accepting the representative action model of character theory,
Judge Posner expressly rejected the causal character model, not
because it is logically "absurd," but rather because an overtly
deterministic view of "free will" is "inconsistent" with the very
premise of capital sentencing.4 2
Neither causal nor capacity character theories, however, are
inconsistent with the choice theory set forth above.243 Both focus on
the issue of the actor's ability to make a "free choice" at the time the
offensive act was committed. Causal theories attempt to expand the
range of inputs recognized as relevant to the question of whether the
act was "freely chosen," and are thus entirely consistent with a focus
on choice. Capacity models shift the emphasis of the inquiry from the
specific circumstances of the choice, to the broader issue of the actor's
capacity to choose. But, if the actor lacks a capacity to freely choose,
obviously, there is no logical basis to conclude that the choice was
freely made. Accordingly, capacity theories too are consistent with
the choice model.
The representative action model, however, is different, in that it
posits that the purpose of retribution is not to proportion the
punishment to the evil of the act, but rather to proportion the
punishment to the evil of the character to whom the act is attributed
on the theory that even if one cannot be held responsible for one's
acts, which are determined, one can nonetheless be held responsible
for the formation of one's character. To the extent the representative
model of retribution would focus the punishment inquiry on the
quality of the defendant's character, it is not substantially different, in
effect if not in metaphysical origin, from Wechsler's own offender-
241. Stewart v. Gramley, 74 F.3d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1996).
242. Id.
243. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 959, 973 (1992) ("[V]olition and character appear as complimentary rather than as
hostile or mutually exclusive sources of responsibility"); R.A. Duff, Choice, Character, and
Criminal Liability, 12 LAW & PHIL. 345, 378 (1993) (suggesting that "there is something
spurious about the general controversy between 'choice' and 'character' theorists.").
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based theory. 2" The main difference is that Whereas Wechsler would
incapacitate a defendant with a bad character because of the danger
he presented to society, the representative action retributivist would
do so because the defendant deserved it for poor cultivation of his
character. In any event, the representative action model is not
cognizable as a theory of retribution in the sense in which I here
employ the term.
B. Retribution and Deterrence
Of course, the Court has never relied solely on retribution to
justify the death penalty. Rather, it has repeatedly invoked both
retribution and deterrence as the twin justificatory bases on which
capital punishment rests." But the linkage between retribution and
deterrence is tight. Although deterrence is a forward-looking
justification, and retribution backward-looking, both ultimately turn
on the same criteria. Deterrent punishment makes no sense where the
conduct sought to be deterred is non-deterrable. Retributive
punishment, as we have seen, is unwarranted where conduct is not the
product of free choice. Because deterrence can only be effective
where the actor can consider the consequences of her acts and make a
rational choice to refrain from the act because of the threat of
punishment, the only truly deterrable acts are ones that are also freely
chosen. 26  Accordingly, a sentencing outcome based entirely on
principles of deterrence will, happily, overlap almost entirely with one
244. The representative-action model, like Wechsler's offender-based sentencing
model, is unsatisfactory for another reason: it fails to provide a practical basis to properly
assign blame. Although it may be a plausible hypothesis that persons are, more or less,
responsible for their character, it is difficult, if not impossible, to judge the extent to which
attributions of responsibility are warranted. If one person was "made bad" by the terrible
circumstances of his youth or upbringing, does his "badness," reflected in his tendency to
engage in criminal acts, deserve more or less blame than a person who commits a criminal
act, but otherwise exhibits a "good" character? If a person exhibits a "bad" character, but
was not the subject of terrible abuse, poverty, or neglect as a child, is it necessarily fair to
infer that such person is therefore responsible, or more responsible, for his bad character
than others? What if that person was genetically or biologically predisposed to such
"badness" of character? Is he any more or less blameworthy for his character than the
person whose environment, rather than genes, provided the root cause? To what extent
do we, or can we, ever know what causes character to form as it does? And even if
scientists might posit theories or devise methods of investigation, capital courtrooms and
jury deliberation rooms are surely not the proper forum to resolve that debate.
245. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002) (identifying retribution and
deterrence as the "social purposes served by the death penalty"); Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 183-84 (1976).
246. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 221, at 33 (arguing that punishing choices allows
actors to "maximally predict what will follow" upon their decisions).
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based on principles of retribution. 47
But Wechsler and Michael's contention that the aims of
incapacitation are equally consistent with those of deterrence was
founded on a supposition that, on reflection, proves the
inapplicability of their approach to capital punishment.2 8  If
dangerousness, rather than blameworthiness, is the critical factor in
determining "treatment," whether the conduct is deterrable is beside
the point. For those who can be deterred, the threat of severe
"treatment" is likely to be effective. For those who cannot,
incapacitory treatment - in civil or penal institutions, with
appropriate rehabilitative care where possible - is still necessary.
Either way, the state's interest in protecting its citizens from
dangerous individuals justifies the "punitive" treatment of offenders.
But, of course, most if not all of the state's incapacitative goals
can be achieved through "treatment options" - such as life sentences
without possibility of parole - that are less draconian than capital
punishment. Once it is conceded that capital punishment as an
incapacitatory mechanism is (no pun intended) a form of overkill, it is
hard to escape the conclusion that incapacitation goals and deterrence
goals are at odds. To be sure, Wechsler and Michael recognized as
much, conceding that "there is less justification for execution to
incapacitate than for the death penalty to deter."24 9 But if that is
conceded, then it is precisely the traditional rules that govern the
defendant's "responsibility" - i.e., traditional indicia of culpability,
rather than dangerousness - that must separate the class of offenders
whose conduct logically could be altered through deterrent means.
50
247. Wechsler and Michael make much the same point, arguing that "[t]he common
law rules prescribing the limits of legal 'responsibility' may properly be understood as an
effort to define this class of [non-deterrable] persons." Wechsler & Michael I, supra note
14, at 752.
248. At times, Wechsler and Michael argue that dangerousness alone can justify the
most "thorough" form of incapacitation: "execution." See Wechsler & Michael II, supra
note 14, at 1315 (arguing that "the offenders who ought to be incapacitated most
thoroughly are the most dangerous and the least corrigible," and the "ordering of the
thoroughness of incapacitation.., accomplished through execution or life
imprisonment.., is strictly comparable to that ordering of the severity of treatment in
accordance with the characters of offenders which is employed in order to mitigate
deterrent penalties.").
249. Wechsler & Michael II, supra note 14, at 1316.
250. I do not mean to suggest that these implications were not fully apparent to
Wechsler and Michael. They were. See Wechsler & Michael I, supra note 14, at 728
(noting that "the function of the rules governing responsibility, like the distinction
between murder and manslaughter, is to determine the type of treatment.").
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C. The Court's Recognition of Retributive Principles in Capital
Sentencing
Notwithstanding the Court's adherence to the MPC procedural
sentencing model, its evolving preference for viewing capital
punishment through the lens of retributivism has emerged in several
decisional lines. The best example is provided by the proportionality
cases that established hard floors prohibiting the execution of persons
whose offenses either caused an insufficiently substantial harm to
warrant imposition of the ultimate sanction, or whose conduct in
causing a sufficient harm was insufficiently culpable.
In Coker v. Georgia, the Court applied the proportionality
principle to conclude that death was an unconstitutionally
disproportionate response to the crime of the rape of an adult
woman."~ In so ruling, the Court announced a de facto presumption
that the death penalty is only available to punish harms involving the
death of other human beings, or crimes of similar or greater
magnitude. 2 The Court was at pains to acknowledge the magnitude
of the offense of rape, and the compelling state interest in deterring
such crimes. The Court also acknowledged the state's strong interest
in incapacitating convicted rapists to prevent them from causing
additional harms to society. However, it concluded, the limiting
principle of desert trumped these concerns. Punishment must be
proportionate to the offense, and the penalty of death was simply too
253extreme a response.
The Court also has limited capital punishment where the
offender lacked sufficient culpability to warrant the ultimate
sanction.'4 The first case establishing that principle was Enmund v.
Florida.55 In Enmund, the defendant had been convicted of felony
251. 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
252. For instance, the crime of treason remains punishable by death, even where the
treasonous conduct does not result in the death of any person. See 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (1994)("Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States, levies war against them or adheres to
their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States or elsewhere, is guilty
of treason and shall suffer death, or shall be imprisoned not less than five years and fined
under this title but not less than $10,000; and shall be incapable of holding any office under
the United States.").
253. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592.
254. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137(1987). Several jurisdictions also require proof that defendant was directly responsible for
the killing before a defendant may be considered eligible for the death penalty. See, e.g.,
MD. ANN. CODE, art. 27, § 413 (1996).
255. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
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murder and had been sentenced to death."6 The evidence at trial
supported at most the inference that defendant was in the vehicle
present at the scene where the crime occurred."7 There was no
evidence that Enmund intended the death of any person. 8 In the
absence of intention, the Court reasoned, it is impermissible to
attribute the resulting harm to the free or voluntary conduct of the
offender, and thus it found a sentence of death to be disproportionate
to the gravity of the offense.2 9  Again, the Court concluded that
retributive principles of proportionality - or just desert - precluded
imposition of the punishment.2 °
In Thompson v. Oklahoma, a plurality established a similar
minimum culpability floor for offenders under the age of sixteen."
As the plurality reasoned, given "the lesser culpability of the juvenile
offender, the teenager's capacity for growth, and society's fiduciary
obligations to its children, [retributive justifications are] simply
inapplicable to the execution of a fifteen-year-old offender., 262 The
Court reaffirmed its commitment to the minimum culpability
principle most recently in Atkins v. Virginia,263 when it barred
execution of mentally-retarded defendants. In so holding, the Court
reaffirmed that persons whose offenses were committed below a
minimum threshold of culpability are not subject to capital
punishment.
In Atkins, the Court expanded on the minimum harm and
culpability rules announced in Coker and Enmund when it concluded
that even "mere" murder is an insufficient harm to justify a sentence
of death.26  Of course, such reasoning diverges from a strict
256. Id. at 784.
257. Id. at 788.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 798. The Court further clarified, in Tison, 481 U.S. at 137, that the Eighth
Amendment's proportionality requirement was satisfied only when the defendant's mental
state was comparably culpable.
260. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801 ("For purposes of imposing the death penalty,
Enmund's criminal culpability must be limited to his participation in the robbery, and his
punishment must be tailored to his personal responsibility and moral guilt. Putting
Enmund to death to avenge two killings that he did not commit and had no intention of
committing or causing does not measurably contribute to the retributive end of ensuring
that the criminal gets his just deserts.").
261. 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988). But the concurring opinion rejects any absolute bar on
executing persons under sixteen. See id. at 848-59 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
262. Id. at 836-37.
263. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
264. Id. at 319 (explaining that "the culpability of the average murderer is insufficient
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application of the lex talionis, which by its literal terms would
authorize capital punishment for any homicide offense. In light of
"evolving standards of decency," '265 the figurative "eye for an eye and
a tooth for a tooth," reasoned the Court, now means a figurative eye
for an eye, and a tooth. Nonetheless, these decisions all reflect the
basic retributive principle of minimum proportionality, judged in
terms of harm inflicted or culpability attending the causative acts.
In another line of cases, the Court has suggested a preference for
a comparative approach, and has stated that the death penalty ought
to be limited to the "the worst criminals or the criminals who commit
the worst crimes. ' 266 Indeed, if one principle emerged from Furman, it
was that capital sentencing procedures must, at least, provide a more
rational method to select the few who would die from the many who
are eligible. In the famous words of Justice Stewart, where only a few
are capriciously selected to die from among many committing crimes
just as reprehensible, the imposition of the death sentence is "cruel
and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel
and unusual., 267  The Court has thus reiterated time and again the
constitutional requirement that death penalty schemes effectively
"narrow" the class of capital offenders. The attempt to do so requires
sentences to be based on comparative principles.26
These cases demonstrate that, despite the Court's acceptance of
the MPC procedural rubric, its substantive approach to the death
penalty has consistently reflected the basic insights of retributive
theory. That is, capital punishment is "justly deserved," if it is ever
deserved, if and only if two criteria exist. First, the harm caused or
to justify the most extreme sanction available to the State"). See also Godfrey v. Georgia,
446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980) (holding that not only need the crime be a murder in which the
defendant actually intended the death of his victim, but the circumstances of the offense
must "have reflected a consciousness materially more 'depraved' than that of any person
guilty of murder"). These decisions were foreshadowed in the plurality's opinion in
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 295-96 (1976) ("The actions of sentencing juries
suggest that under contemporary standards of decency death is viewed as an inappropriate
punishment for a substantial portion of convicted first-degree murderers.")
265. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 301 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
266. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 n.15 (1983) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 294 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring)) (holding that to be constitutional, a death
penalty scheme "must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the
defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.").
267. Furman, 408 U.S. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
268. See, e.g., Zant, 462 U.S. at 885 (1983) (explaining that narrowing of class of
persons eligible to be put to death is a necessary attribute of any constitutional death
penalty scheme).
269. Many would argue that death is never "justly deserved," regardless of the amount
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intended must have been sufficiently great so that, under the principle
of lex talionis, it can reasonably be said that death constitutes a
proportionate response. Second, the actor's choice to engage in
harmful conduct must have been the product of the actor's "free
choice," that is, sufficiently free of external interference to justify
holding the actor fully responsible as a moral agent for that harm.
IV. Exorcising Wechsler's Ghost: Restructuring Capital
Sentencing by Disaggregating Aggravation, Mitigation,
Vengeance, and Mercy
If, as I have argued, there is a disconnect between the procedural
mechanisms sanctioned by the Court and the philosophical
justifications it has recognized for the death penalty, the question
remains: does it matter? Would an express commitment to
retributive principles require a different, and better, set of capital
sentencing procedures? If so, what would they be? In attempting to
answer that question, let me begin by turning to the current work
being conducted by the ALI to revise the MPC's sentencing
provisions in light of more contemporary notions of the proper place
of retributive principles in sentencing practice.27
A. Revising the Model Penal Code: "Limiting" or "Determining"
Retributivism
In updating the Model Penal Code's sentencing provisions, the
ALI has indicated an intent to develop a new "framework of purposes
for a revised Code." '271 Concluding that the Code's rehabilitative and
incapacitative orientation is no longer theoretically, empirically, or
morally sound, nor politically defensible, the ALI Plan for Revision
of the MPC's sentencing provisions proposes a reformulation based
on what Norval Morris described as "limiting retributivism." '272 The
of harm caused by the actor or his degree of culpability. Although I am sympathetic to
those arguments, as a matter of constitutional law, those arguments have not prevailed.
Rather, the Supreme Court has proceeded on the assumption that death remains a morally
justifiable response to certain especially noisome conduct. See HUGO A. BEDAU, THE
KILLING STATE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN LAW, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 47-49 (Austin
Sarat ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1999) (arguing that life imprisonment imposes a fully
proportionate response to even the most heinous killing sunder retributive principles).
The analysis in this Article assumes that conclusion, arguendo.
270. See Reitz, supra note 7.
271. See Reitz, supra note 7, at 545 n.23.
272. See id. at 555 & nn.37-38, 556 (citing NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF
IMPRISONMENT (Norval Morris et al. eds., Univ. of Chi. Press 1974); NORVAL MORRIS,
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proposed retributive framework is "limiting" in the sense that the
retributive principles are not called to produce certain and fixed
sentences in each case, but rather limit the discretion of the sentencer
to a range of punishment outcomes that is generally proportionate to
the gravity of the underlying offenses.73 To this end, the Plan for
Revision envisions retribution to serve two main purposes. First,
retribution can "at least insist that offenses and offenders be
compared with one another in an organized way when assigning levels
of punishment. 2 7'  By scaling punishment to the gravity of the
offense, without need to explore the deterrence benefits or the
incapacitative pay-offs (both of which are extraordinarily difficult to
calculate), retribution "can supply a default algorithm for punishment
decisions." 275
Second, retribution can "operate as an important limitation upon
utilitarian goals." Taking its cue in large part from Morris's work, the
Plan for Revision suggests developing a sentencing framework that
sets penal ranges based on retributive principles, but that leaves room
for play to allow rehabilitative or incapacitative aims to be pursued.276
Although moral judgments are necessarily "imprecise," they
nonetheless can "tell us that a certain level of punishment is clearly
too high and, at a different point, that it would clearly be too low. ' ' 7
Where insufficient information is available to make reliable utilitarian
judgments about the proper course of punishment, the sentence
would be based solely on a retributive conception of
proportionality.278
The Plan for Revision does not specifically address capital
sentencing, and it is hard to see how the principles set forth therein
might meaningfully alter current capital sentencing practices. In fact,
limiting retributivism fairly accurately describes the capital sentencing
MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (Franklin E. Zimring et al. ed., Univ. of Chi. Press
1982); NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBATION:
INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING SYSTEM (Oxford Univ.
Press 1990).
273. See NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (Norval Morris et al.
eds., Univ. of Chi. Press 1974) (discussing limiting retributive sentencing principles).
274. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, PLAN FOR REVISION (Jan. 24, 2002), 6
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 525, 555-56 & nn.39-40, 556 (2002), available at
http://wings.buffalo.edu/law/bclc/bclrarticles/6/l/reitzpdf.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. See id. at 556-57 nn.40-41.
[Vol. 31:3
Spring 2004] THE MPC AND DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING 243
philosophy that already has been embraced by the Court in its post-
Furman capital jurisprudence. For instance, the Court's insistence
that the death penalty not be imposed "wantonly or freakishly, 2 79 but
rather be reserved only for the worst offenses and the worst
offenders, represents an attempt to ensure that death sentences are
imposed with rough comparative proportionality. And the Court's
minimum harm and minimum culpability cases, likewise, enforce a
substantive proportionality by establishing that some offenses are
simply not sufficiently grave to warrant a sentence of death. The
current framework, however, defines the lower reaches, but after
circumscribing the "death-eligible" class, leaves room for other, non-
retributive factors, to determine the actual sentence.
Limiting retributivism may well represent an appropriate
framework around which to reconstruct general sentencing principles,
but it does not go far enough in the peculiar context of capital
punishment. Whereas the full mix of retributive and utilitarian penal
concerns are present when the options available to the sentencer are
imprisonment for a determinate or indeterminate term, or supervised
or unsupervised release to the community, utilitarian considerations
should play a negligible role in the binary context of case-specific
capital punishment dispositions, where the choice facing the sentencer
is almost always death or life imprisonment (or its functional
equivalent).2" Certainly, as members of the Court have observed, the
choice between life or death cannot turn on issues of rehabilitation
and incapacitation, nor can it coherently turn on the issue of
deterrence. Although deterrence is an appropriate consideration in
devising a capital punishment regime, it makes little sense at the level
of individual case disposition. Deterrent purposes are served by the
announcement, ex ante, that offenders will be sentenced to death
when they engage in certain proscribed conduct. Where the death
penalty is imposed based on considerations that only become
apparent to the fact-finder after the offensive conduct is complete, the
resulting sentence simply cannot serve a deterrent purpose in that
case.
If retribution is the only theoretically-sound basis on which to
279. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
280. Although Texas does not currently offer sentencers the option of sentencing the
offender to life imprisonment without possibility of parole, it requires that persons
sentenced to life serve a minimum term of forty years. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
37.071, § 2(2)(e)(2)(B). The average offender, thus, will not be returned to society until he
is over the age of sixty.
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select a sentence of death rather than a sentence of life imprisonment,
then the kind of retributive framework called for in the context of
capital punishment must be less "limiting" and more "determining"
than is reflected in the ALI's announced approach to revision of the
MPC's non-capital sentencing provisions. The retributive framework
necessary to that goal must begin by establishing minimum standards
of proportionality. But sentencing procedures must do more than
simply identify a set of defendants whose crimes are sufficiently grave
to satisfy minimum proportionality concerns and then allow the actual
sentencing disposition to turn on utilitarian justifications like the
offender's dangerous character. Although the Court has embraced
the retributive principle that only the most deserving offenders should
be subject to the most severe sanction, the original MPC sentencing
procedures simply do not, and are not designed to, identify those
offenders, and the principle of limiting retributivism is inadequate to
fully rectify the problem.
In the remaining portion of this Article, I will spell out some of
the structural implications suggested by a retribution-determined
sentencing system that goes beyond the ALI's current scope of
revision.
B. Restructuring the Penalty Phase
Given the extraordinary degree to which Wechsler's ideas
pervade contemporary death penalty law, it is not easy to visualize
how the landscape would look shorn of his influence. But the
preceding analysis makes one thing certain. If retribution were given
more prominence in capital sentencing procedure, evaluations of the
offender's character - either in aggravation or mitigation - would no
longer play the dominant - or even a permissible - role at sentencing.
Instead, eligibility would be determined based on extraordinary harm,
and culpability (defined in terms of choice) would replace character
as the other main determinant of sentence. To achieve that goal, the
open-ended and virtually unregulated sentencing trial now the norm
in almost every jurisdiction"' would be substituted with a two-part
serial inquiry: first, was the harm caused sufficiently extraordinary to
281. Texas, in structuring the death penalty determination around its "special issues,"
is in some respects again an outlier. See Penny J. White, A Response and Retort, 33 CONN.
L. REv. 899, 906 (2001) (describing Texas death penalty scheme approved by the court in
Jurek v. Texas as "categorically different"). But even in Texas, the centrality of the future
dangerousness issue, combined with the constitutional requirement that all relevant
mitigating evidence be permitted, permits virtually any matter to be presented to the
sentencing jury.
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warrant eligibility for a sentence of death; second, was the defendant
fully culpable for her conduct?
Of course, if post-guilt proceedings were circumscribed in the
manner I suggest, the scope of issues that could permissibly be raised
by either side at sentencing would be reduced. Such presumptive
limits, I would argue, would help defendants who can effectively
prove that their culpability was actually diminished at the time they
committed the offense for which they are being sentenced.282  This
limitation would ensure that evidence of diminished culpability is not
lost or negated by the State's non-culpability-related aggravating
evidence. Still, any such scheme must preserve the defendant's time-
honored privilege to plead for the mercy of the Court. Character
evidence, however, should only be heard if the defendant puts the
issue in play, because issues of "character" and future dangerousness
are relevant to the sentencer's determination only with respect to
whether the individual should be shown mercy. 283 Reworking the
focus of the penalty phase would thus give the defendant the
opportunity to decide if a plea of mercyis appropriate.
1. Extraordinary Harm
Only those persons who commit the worst crimes ought to be
eligible for a death sentence. It has long been settled that "mere
murder" is insufficient to justify a death sentence. The narrowing
function recognized as essential to any constitutionally-permissible
death penalty scheme reflects this fact.2 ' Every death penalty statute
requires the fact-finder to find the existence of some aggravating
282. To the extent that capital sentencing really turns on comparative principles (e.g.,
executing the "worst" offenders and offenses), it is a zero sum game. In theory, relying on
culpability to provide the primary ordering principle merely has the effect of changing the
line-up of individuals deemed best-suited for execution - i.e., the list of the "worst." In
practice, however, because juries and courts do not actually engage in a comparative
exercise, but rather make decisions in individual cases about individual desert, changing
the evaluative criteria would have an effect on how many are selected for execution, as
well as who.
283. As Jeffrie Murphy has convincingly argued, when a jury - or any institution acting
in a representative capacity - imposes a sentence less severe than that warranted by the
gravity of the offense, its actions are not consistent with "justice," even if the sentiment
motivating the sentence was otherwise commendable. See JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN
HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 167 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) ("What
business does [the sentencing judge] have, then, ignoring his obligations to justice while he
pursues some private, idiosyncratic, and not publicly accountable virtue of love or
compassion?").
284. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878 (1983).
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factor before a defendant can be sentenced to death.2 85 But there is
no requirement that the requisite aggravating factor reflect a finding
that the defendant's acts caused extraordinary harm. An express
finding to that effect, however, is essential to both the minimum and
comparative approaches to retributive sentencing. The universe of
capitally-punishable acts should be circumscribed by findings that the
harms caused by the defendant set this particular defendant's conduct
into a separate category worthy of proportionally more severe
punishment. Findings that the defendant caused multiple deaths,
tortured his victim before killing, or was engaged in additional
criminal conduct in the course of the killing all might satisfy an
extraordinary harm finding. A finding of mere "coldbloodedness,"
' 6
of a particular motiveY or that the killing occurred in the course of
other felonious conductm (which goes to culpability rather than
harm) would be insufficient to satisfy the requirement. Once the fact-
finder has found, beyond reasonable doubt, that the defendant caused
extraordinary harm, and only once this has been found, the inquiry
then should turn to the issue of culpability.
2. Replacing Character with Culpability
As we have seen, retributive theory suggests that the individuals
who deserve the severest punishment must not only cause the most
harm, but must act with the highest degree of culpability. To comport
with those retributive aims, sentencing proceedings must direct the
fact-finder to focus on culpability. To do so, the universe of evidence
admissible at the penalty phase must be circumscribed much more
tightly. As discussed above, the Court's laissez faire approach' has
285. See Tuilaepa v. California 512 U.S. 967, 971-72 (1994) ("To render a defendant
eligible for the death penalty in a homicide case, we have indicated that the trier of fact
must convict the defendant of murder and find one "'aggravating circumstance' (or its
equivalent) at either the guilt or penalty phase.").
286. Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 472 (1993) (upholding death sentence based on
jury finding of aggravating fact that defendant was a "cold-blooded, pitiless slayer").
287. See, e.g., Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 595 (2002) (defendant sentenced to death
based on finding statutory aggravating circumstance that the killing was committed in
expectation of receipt of something of "pecuniary value"; sentence overturned not
because such aggravating factor was inappropriate, but because it was found by judge
rather than jury in violation of Ring's Sixth Amendment right to jury trial).
288. See, e.g., Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 104 (2003) (affirming death
sentence imposed where state presented evidence of one statutory aggravating
circumstance: commission of the murder while in the perpetration of a felony).
289. The Court has denied that there is any one central issue at stake at the penalty
phase. See Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 950 (1982) (observing that unlike the guilt
phase, "[i]n fixing a penalty,... there is no similar 'central issue' from which the jury's
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transformed the sentencing proceeding into a speculative inquest into
the defendant's past conduct and present disposition 21 which
privileges the emotional responses of the sentencer over the
rational.291
A retributive approach to capital sentencing would dispense with
the offender-based inquiry championed by Wechsler and the MPC
and instead focus more systematically on the culpability which
accompanied the defendant's particularly harmful acts. 92 As Dressler
has urged, "whether, and the extent to which, blame and punishment
are deserved" should not turn on "the nature of the offender's
character" but rather "the narrower issue of whether the offender, at
the time of the offense, possessed and had a fair chance" to exercise
his or her "free choice., 293  Replacing character evaluation with
culpability assessment would ensure that the sentence imposed rests
"on the "moral guilt" of the defendant" that flows directly from his or
her volitional conduct.
Attempting to evaluate the dangerousness or defect of the
offender's character distorts that inquiry in four ways. First, the
dangerousness evidenced by the offender's character is irrelevant to
the capital sentencing decision, because sentences of death and life
imprisonment both effectively incapacitate the offender. Second,
sentencing proceedings that focus on the perceived propensities of
defendants to cause future harms are speculative, and provide
substantial room for stereotypical and discriminatory assumptions to
attention may be diverted." Once eligibility is established, "the jury then is free to
consider a myriad of factors to determine whether death is the appropriate punishment."
(Quoting California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1008 (1982))).
290. Researchers for the multi-state Capital Juror Project have found that "topics
related to the defendant's dangerousness should he ever return to society (including the
possibility and timing of such a return) are second only to the crime itself in the attention
they receive during the jury's penalty phase deliberations." See Blume et al., supra note
179, at 404.
291. See, e.g., Pillsbury, supra note 202, at 657 (arguing that sentencing should turn on
competing claims of empathy for the defendant and outrage at his or her criminal acts);
Dan M. Kahan, The Anatomy of Disgust in Criminal Law, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1621 (1998)
(reviewing WILLIAM IAN MILLER, THE ANATOMY OF DISGUST (Harvard Univ. Press
1997) (arguing that disgust sentiment has appropriate place in sentencing deliberations));
Elizabeth T. Bangs, Disgust and Drownings in Texas: The Law Must Tackle Emotion
When Women Kill Their Children, 12 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 87 (2001) (reviewing SUSAN
A. BANDES, THE PASSIONS OF LAW (N.Y. Univ. Press 1999) (arguing that disgust is an
inappropriate consideration in sentencing determinations)). Such emotional responses
are, I would contend, obviously irrelevant to the issue of principal concern to
retributivism: the defendant's moral desert with regard to a particular offense.
292. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 481 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
293. Dressier, supra note 183, at 674-75.
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operate. Third, because many offender characteristics that suggest a
real or perceived threat of future danger also indicate diminished
culpability, any proceeding in which sentencers are required to
balance such factors is unworkable. Finally, even if "accuracy" in
capital sentencing is conceded to be a coherent value, the component
of judgment that must be accurate is a moral rather than a factual
one. The judgmental function of the jury is effectively usurped to the
extent that juries defer to expert testimony on the crucial
determinants of sentence.
a. The Irrelevance of Dangerous Character to the Death Penalty
Decision
The issue of dangerous or defective character is fundamentally
irrelevant to the choice presented in the ordinary capital sentencing
proceeding: death or life imprisonment.29 ' Under any retributivist
framework, the Court's willingness to allow sentencers to consider
dangerous character must be reconsidered. In permitting the
consideration of future dangerousness in Jurek v. Texas,295 the
plurality reasoned that because sentencing determinations typically
rest at least in part on considerations of future conduct, the
defendant's future conduct must be an appropriate consideration in
all contexts. But it is precisely the irrelevance of the defendant's
future conduct in the capital context that was disputed by the plaintiff
in Jurek. As the author of the plurality opinion in Jurek subsequently
observed,29 even if incapacitative goals are among the mix of proper
sentencing considerations in choosing a term of imprisonment, they
play a quite marginal role in the capital sentencing decision, especially
where the jury is deciding between life imprisonment without
possibility of parole and death.29' In such circumstances, the question
294. This was far less true when Wechsler and Michael wrote in the 1930s, and those
authors argued that life imprisonment, in any event, was not a realistic administrative
option, because building sufficient prison capacity to house life prisoners in large numbers
was prohibitively expensive, and as "the utter destitution of men without hope makes their
government in prisons in large numbers an exceedingly difficult if not an impossible task."
Wechsler & Michael I, supra note 14, at 1267. The prevalence of true life sentences are a
much more recent phenomena.
295. 428 U.S. 262, 275 (1976).
296. See Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 517 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In
capital sentencing decisions.., rehabilitation plays no role[, and] incapacitation is largely
irrelevant, at least when the alternative of life imprisonment without possibility of parole
is available.").
297. The Texas scheme is made more unique because Texas is one of the few states
that does not provide the option of a life sentence without possibility of parole. Texas
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of future dangerousness is only logically relevant to the extent the
offender poses a threat to persons imprisoned in the same facility or
in the event that the prisoner escapes from custody. The former plays
little actual role in jury decisionmaking, and the latter rarely occurs.298
In practical terms, then, incapacitation and rehabilitation
justifications should be irrelevant to the decision between sentences
of death and life without the possibility of parole.2 99 The Court's
quick assumption in Jurek that future dangerousness is an appropriate
basis to choose death over life imprisonment therefore evinces a
failure to recognize not only that, but how, "death is different."
Not only is the dangerousness inquiry problematic, but so is the
evidence typically introduced during penalty-phase proceedings to
prove it. Certainly, prior bad acts, bad reputation, post-conviction
prison misbehavior, and other evidence introduced with the principal
objective of proving bad character should presumptively be barred.
As a subset of prior bad acts, prior criminal convictions also should
not receive special consideration by the sentencer in determining
whether the defendant's offense was mitigated. After all, even more
than an unproved prior bad act, a prior conviction represents a
transaction that already has been "paid for," and for which the
offender previously, and presumptively, got his "just deserts." '00
does, however, require that a defendant sentenced to life imprisonment may not be
released "until the actual time served by the defendant equals 40 years." TEX. CRIM.
PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071, § 2(2)(e)(2)(B).
298. In 1999, 1047 inmates escaped from prison. See Milo Miller, Electrified Prison
Fencing: A Lethal Blow to the Eighth Amendment, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 63, 85 (2001)
(citing THE CORREcTIONS PROFESSIONAL (LRP Publ'ns.), April 16,2001, Vol. 6, No. 14).
That same year, there were approximately 1.9 million persons incarcerated in the nation's
jails and prisons. See Press Release, Bureau of Justice Statistics (April 19, 2000), at
http://www.ojp.gov/bjs/pub/press/pjim99.pr (last visited Jul. 19, 2004).
299. Harris, 513 U.S. at 517. Although the Court has recognized the importance of the
principle that the most severe punishment be limited to the "worst" offenses and
offenders, unfortunately, it has never been clear about just what attributes of the offense
or the offender are relevant to that inquiry. Wechsler's answer - that the worst offender is
the most dangerous one - has thus continued to figure large in the equation.
300. Limiting the use of prior bad acts to prove bad character, however, does not
require barring any use of prior convictions in determining sentence. There remains room
within the broad contours of retributive theory for prior convictions to factor in the
sentencing equation. Although the sentencer should not consider the criminal record of
the offender, at the penalty phase as an aggravating fact, nothing bars the legislature from
establishing, as an element of aggravated, or capital murder, the fact of a prior criminal
record. There are plausible retributive reasons to accord significance to prior convictions
(as opposed to prior bad acts). First, the fact that an individual has chosen to recidivate
demonstrates, at least in some cases, a purposeful and deliberate flouting of the law.
Repeat criminal behavior may thus represent a more deliberate, and hence more culpable,
type of conduct than first-time offenses. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell,
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At the same time, just as a retributive sentencing focus limits the
aggravating character evidence relevant to determining a just
sentence, so too does it impose limits on the mitigating evidence that
a defendant may properly put before the sentencer to justify a lesser
sanction. Evidence introduced merely to "humanize" the defendant,
by showing the defendant's difficult childhood, history of abuse,
economic deprivation, or sympathetic demeanor is no more relevant
to a meaningful evaluation of the defendant's culpability than is
evidence of his dangerous character. An expressly retributive
approach to capital sentencing, therefore, would suggest a
presumptive clarification of the principle of individual consideration
to protect only the defendant's constitutional right to proffer
mitigating evidence that is relevant to his or her culpability, that is,
the extent to which her conduct was "freely chosen., 30
1
Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 1303-04 (2001) (arguing that career
criminal statutes "seem to be fueled by concerns about retribution, which are particularly
sharp, many believe, because multiple recidivists have so clearly rejected society's norms
and institutions.").
Second, because the offender already has been exposed, and educated, by her prior
confrontation with the legal system, her new offense might presumably have been
accompanied by a more educated understanding of the harms caused by the offense, of the
moral prohibitions against the conduct, and perhaps even of the facts and circumstances
surrounding the offensive activity. Assuming that to be the case, then the presumption
that her recidivist act represents a graver offense than the comparable offense committed
by a person without a criminal record is not unreasonable.
It is important, however, to cabin the role of prior convictions to a definitional function.
The difference between the notice provided by an ex ante warning, and a notice-less ex
post consideration at the penalty phase, is substantial. First, the onus for defining the
types of prior convictions relevant to the sentencing consideration rests with the
legislature. The legislature may decide that only prior violent crimes establish the
necessary aggravating element; it may decide that crimes committed by juveniles do not
count. It may decide whether multiple prior convictions act as enhanced aggravators, or
that prior convictions must be proved in combination with one or more other statutory
aggravators before the defendant becomes eligible for a capital sentence. In contrast, the
mere fact of prior criminal convictions in determining culpability, apart from these
considerations, is minimal. Indeed, the very aspects of the defendant's character that
suggest diminished culpability, such as mental retardation or youth, might explain both the
presence of the criminal record and mitigate the gravity of the present offense.
Accordingly, prior criminal record cannot meaningfully be "balanced" against the
mitigating evidence by the sentencer in assessing the defendant's culpability. In any case,
whether a prior conviction properly serves a statutory function in establishing an element
of a capital offense, to the extent that it is used to show "bad character" or dangerousness,
it has no place in the sentencing determination.
301. Other commentators assaying the state of capital punishment law have reiterated
the narrower interpretation of mitigating evidence advocated here. See, e.g., Steiker &
Steiker, supra note 10, at 840 (reviewing BEVERLY LOWRY, CROSSED OVER: A
MURDER, A MEMOIR (Alfred A. Knopf 1992) (concluding that "the individualization
requirement mandates consideration only of evidence regarding individual culpability.").
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b. Offender-Based Sentencing and Discrimination
The Wechslerian focus on the dangerousness of the offender's
character, rather than the culpability of his or her acts, also greatly
increases the odds that sentencing outcomes will turn on
impermissible criteria. Factors that should have no significance in the
sentencing decision, such as the race or status of the victim, in fact
play a large role because, in letting everything in and letting the jury
assign "weights" as it pleases, there is no way to prevent the sentencer
from acting on impermissible factors. °2  Consider the following
propositions:
(i) Blacks and other minorities commit crimes of violence at
significantly higher per capita rates than whites;0 3
(ii) Young people commit the vast majority of criminal offenses,
with crime rates falling dramatically among persons 35 and older;3 4
(iii) Men commit crimes of violence at significantly higher rates
than women;3 5 and
(iv) The mentally retarded and the insane have less capacity to
control their conduct and to conform their actions to the law.3
302. In Professor Baldus' study of judge sentencing in Nebraska, data indicated that
the socioeconomic status of victims had a strong effect on the likelihood that the offender
would receive a death sentence. See Richard L. Wiener, Death Penalty Research in
Nebraska: How do Judges and Juries Reach Death Penalty Decisions?, 81 NEB. L. REV.
757, 772 (2002) (discussing the Baldus Nebraska study; see David C. Baldus et al.,
Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: A Legal and
Empirical Analysis of the Nebraska Experience: (1973-1999), 81 NEB. L. REV. 486, 608-616
(2002)).
303. U.S. DOJ statistics indicate that, in 1997, 41% of all persons charged with violent
crimes, and 57% of all persons charged with murder and non-negligent manslaughter,
were black. Only 57% of those charged with violent crimes, and 40% of those charged
with murder or non-negligent manslaughter, were white. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1998
342-44 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann Pastore eds., USGPO 1999). Blacks account for
approximately 12% of the U.S. population.
304. See id. (showing that young persons commit crimes at significantly greater rates
than older persons, and that persons aged between eighteen to twenty commit homicide at
a rate five times higher than persons aged thirty-five to forty); Robinson, supra note 66, at
1451.
305. Statistics suggest that men commit violent crimes at roughly five times the rate of
women, and murder at approximately nine times the rate. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 303, at 341.
306. According to the American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR), among
the mentally retarded, "reduced ability is found in every dimension of the individual's
functioning, including his language, communication, memory, attention, ability to control
impulsivity, moral development, self-concept, self-perception, suggestibility, knowledge of
basic information, and general motivation." Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 345 (1989)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting the AAMR brief); cf
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Each of the above statements is true either as a statistical matter,
in the case of propositions (i), (ii), and (iii), or if not borne out by
statistical evidence, is consonant with anecdotal observation and
common perceptions, as in the case of proposition (iv)." Indeed,
empirical research suggests that most capital jurors believe in the
truth of all four propositions.3°8 If the statistical likelihood that a
defendant will commit future criminal acts is at issue, in a character-
oriented sentencing regime that tries to predict dangerousness, all of
the above propositions provide a seemingly logical basis for a juror to
favor a sentence of death. Moreover, where dangerousness underlies
the sentencing decision, persons convicted of murder while engaged
in other types of criminal behavior will be particularly likely to
receive a death sentence.3°
These suppositions are greatly accentuated by the nature of the
dangerousness inquiry. A jury does not merely ask, in the abstract,
whether the defendant poses a future threat to some other person.
Empirical research shows that jurors give little thought or
consideration to whether the defendant might pose a threat to other
prisoners. 30 Rather, capital sentencers appear to focus on the more
Jennifer L. Skeem & Stephen L. Golding, Describing Jurors' Personal Conceptions Of
Insanity And Their Relationship To Case Judgments, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 561,
581 (2001) (summarizing result of their research as "consistent with past findings that
jurors' conceptions of insanity involve multiple mental state constructs," including
irrationality and "lack of control over thoughts, emotions, or actions").
307. See Jonathan L. Bing, Protecting the Mentally Retarded From Capital Punishment:
State Efforts Since Penry and Recommendations for the Future, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 59, 84 (1996) ("The stereotype that the mentally retarded are more likely to
commit crimes remains despite extensive evidence to the contrary." (citing empirical
studies)).
308. See, e.g., Stephen P. Garvey & Paul Marcus, Virginia's Capital Jurors, 44 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 2063, 2090 (2003) (discussing factors considered by capital jurors); see also
Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 67 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing scholarly studies
demonstrating that death sentences are influenced by, inter alia, "racial discrimination,"
and "discrimination by gender").
309. In South Carolina, for example, an empirical study showed that of 153 persons
sentenced to death after 1976, 102 of them were engaged in armed robbery, fifty-seven in
kidnapping, and thirty-nine in burglary. See John H. Blume, Twenty-Five Years of Death:
A Report of the Cornell Death Penalty Project on the "Modern" Era of Capital Punishment
in South Carolina, 54 S.C. L. REV. 285, 292 n.37 (2002).
310. Empirical evidence shows that the safety of other inmates has never figured large
in jurors' deliberations. See, e.g., Garvey & Marcus, supra note 308, at 2090 (showing that
among thirty-seven factors rated by capital jurors regarding significance in sentencing
decision, only two factors were ranked lower than defendant's dangerousness to others in
prison). Moreover, there is no evidence that inmate-on-inmate violence is
disproportionately attributable to such offenders. See SORENSEN & PILGRIM, supra note
132, at 1256 (noting that empirical studies demonstrate that "murderers are generally
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concrete (but counterfactual) question: does this defendant pose a
risk to me, my family, or my community? 31 Jurors, judges, and the
prosecutors that control the charging decision plainly answer that
question more often in the affirmative when the victim of the crime is
like them (meaning, usually, that he or she is white)."2 Accordingly,
as numerous researchers have documented, capital-sentencing
selection processes regularly impose death sentences in a racially-
biased manner.3 13 This result may be the direct product of the nature
of an offender-based sentencing theory that asks the sentencer to
focus on the perceived future dangerousness the offender presents.
Regardless of whether statistical evidence showing higher crime
rates among certain groups defined by race, sex, age, or mental ability
could lawfully be introduced at a sentencing hearing, there is ample
evidence that juries in capital cases do routinely incorporate such
information into their death penalty deliberations based on their own
stereotypes, biases, and impressions.31 ' What is more, empirical data
suggests that juror concerns about the defendant's future
dangerousness routinely eclipse issues concerning the defendant's
culpability.3 5 Unfortunately, current law does little to encourage an
among the most docile and trustworthy inmates" with remarkably low incidence of violent
rule infractions). Murderers, not without reason, are commonly described as "model
prisoners." See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 363 (1972) (Marshall, J.,
concurring); VICTOR STREIB, DEATH PENALTY FOR JUVENILES 37 (1987) (quoted in
Joseph L. Hoffmann, On The Perils Of Line-Drawing: Juveniles And The Death Penalty,
40 HASTINGS L.J. 229, 283 n.262 (1989) ( "[J]uvenile murderers tend to be model
prisoners and have a very low rate of recidivism when released."); Blume et al., supra note
179, at 404.
311. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 213, at 1327 (speculating based on analysis of
empirical data that where "jurors can imagine themselves or their loved ones as victims,
death penalties are more likely to be imposed"). This assumption is further buttressed by
evidence demonstrating an urban-rural racial divide, where in predominantly white rural
areas sentence black defendants to death at higher rates than whites, but in urban areas
with larger percentages of blacks on juries, whites are sentenced to death at higher rates
than blacks. See David Baldus et al., Monitoring and Evaluating Contemporary Death
Sentencing Systems: Lessons from Georgia, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1375, 1405-06 (1985).
312. In 126 of the 153 cases in the South Carolina study, the victim was (or victims
were) white. See Blume, supra note 309, at 292 n.38.
313. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Eliminating Discrimination in Administering the Death
Penalty: The Need for the Racial Justice Act, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 519, 519-23 (1995)
(citing studies, including the now-famous study by David Baldus, David Baldus et al.,
Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661 (1983), showing that an African-American who kills a
white is several times more likely to be sentenced to death than an African-American who
kills another African-American).
314. See generally, Blume et al., supra note 179.
315. See e.g., Miller v. State, 373 So. 2d 882, 882 (Fla. 1979) (observing that based on
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alternative result. In fact, by permitting character to play such a large
role, jurors are now essentially instructed to take factors like race or
sex into account. By shifting the focus of sentencing away from the
offender's character and to the offender's culpability, it is far less
likely that these factors would influence sentencing outcomes.
c. The Ambiguity of Offender-Based Sentencing
Not only are some indicia, such as the defendant's or victim's
race, irrelevant to the issue of desert, other factors suggesting
dangerousness, such as youth or mental disability, are actually
inversely related to personal culpability. Although both youth and
mental disability, because they indicate diminished culpability,"6 are
recognized as important mitigating factors by the Court and most
statutory schemes,3 7 commentators have frequently noted that such
indicia often have the practical effect of enhancing the perceived
"deathworthiness" of the defendant because they appear as facets of
dangerous character.3 8 Where future dangerousness is a recognized
basis for capital punishment, as it almost everywhere is, the current
offender-based sentencing construct requires sentencers to assign
both aggravating and mitigating weight to the same fact, as incoherent
as that mental calculation may be.319 As a result, factors that counsel
statutory aggravating circumstance of future dangerousness, the trial judge sentenced to
death a defendant who introduced extensive medical evidence showing that he was a
schizophrenic and suffered from hallucinations), discussed in Ellen Fels Berkman, Mental
Illness As an Aggravating Circumstance in Capital Sentencing, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 291,
296-98 (1989). See also Blume et al., supra note 179, at 404 ("[F]uture dangerousness
overshadows evidence presented in mitigation (such as the defendant's intelligence,
remorse, alcoholism, mental illness)... 1.
316. See, e.g., Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 12 (Powell, J., concurring) (noting
that fact of defendant's youth at time of crime "tended to diminish the defendant's
responsibility for his acts," because "youths 'are less mature and responsible than adults,"'
and "'deserve less punishment because adolescents may have less capacity to control their
conduct and to think in long-range terms than adults."' (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma,
455 U.S. 104, 116, 115 n.11 (1982)).
317. See, e.g., Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993) ("There is no dispute that a
defendant's youth is a relevant mitigating circumstance"); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487
U.S. 815, 835 (1987) (plurality opinion) (noting that "the Court has already endorsed the
proposition that less culpability should attach to a crime committed by a juvenile than to a
comparable crime committed by an adult."). At least thirty states expressly recognize the
age of the defendant as a mitigating factor. See Johnson, 509 U.S. at 376 n.* (collecting
state statutes).
318. Jordan Steiker, The Limits of Legal Language: Decisionmaking in Capital Cases,
94 MICH. L. REV. 2590 (1996); Joshua N. Sondheimer, Note, A Continuing Source of
Aggravation: The Improper Consideration of Mitigating Factors in Death Penalty
Sentencing, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 409 (1990).
319. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989); Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001).
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for mitigation sometimes provide the very basis upon which a
sentencer chooses a death sentence. Thus, tolerance or
encouragement of sentencing based on dangerous character directly
threatens core retributive values by endowing markers of diminished
culpability with an aggravating significance. 20
This phenomenon was well-illustrated in Johnson v. Texas, where
the defendant was nineteen-years-old at the time the capital offense
was committed.321 At the penalty phase, Johnson's lawyers presented
evidence that the offense was attributable in large part to his
immaturity. Notwithstanding his youth, the jury sentenced Johnson
to death, finding as Texas law requires, that Johnson constituted "a
continuing threat to society. 3 2   The appeals courts then rejected
Johnson's claim that Texas's capital sentencing scheme - which
directed the jury's sentencing deliberations solely to whether the
killing was deliberate and whether Johnson posed a risk of future
dangerousness - did not allow the jury to give adequate consideration
to his youth as a mitigating factor. When the case came before the
Supreme Court, the majority acknowledged that Johnson's youth
might have been considered as an aggravating, rather than a
mitigating, factor, but refused to overturn Johnson's death sentence,
reasoning that the jury had not been precluded altogether from
considering the mitigating aspects of the evidence.323
Virtually the identical problem arose in the Penry cases, except
that instead of youth, the mitigating factor defendant sought to raise
was mental retardation. Like youth, mental retardation is a widely
accepted mitigating factor, precisely because it indicates that the
offender's capacity to make morally informed choices is diminished.
Unlike in Johnson, the Court concluded that absent specific
instructions, Texas's future ' dangerousness-oriented death penalty
scheme precluded the jury from giving effect to this mitigating factor.
325
As a result, it twice overturned a death sentence imposed on Penry.
320. As the Court has observed, "reliance on mental retardation as a mitigating factor
can be a two-edged sword that may enhance the likelihood that the aggravating factor of
future dangerousness will be found by the jury." Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321
(2002).
321. 509 U.S. 350 (1993).
322. Id. at 358.
323. Id. at 368 (concluding that there was "no reasonable likelihood that the jury
would have found itself foreclosed from considering the relevant aspects of petitioner's
youth.").
324. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001).
325. Id.
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For clinically-provable cases of mental retardation, the Court has
resolved the problem posed by the Texas statute. In Atkins v.
Virginia, the Court held that a mentally retarded defendant is
insufficiently culpable as a matter of law to warrant execution.326
Atkins thus ameliorates the impact that dangerous character plays in
the most extreme cases of mental retardation. But the Atkins rule
provides no help to persons whose intelligence is markedly below
average, but not far enough below the norm to justify a clinical
diagnosis of mental retardation.
Circumstances such as youth and mental illness unambiguously
reduce a defendant's culpability and counsel for a less severe
sentence. However, under the MPC-influenced offender-based
sentencing regimes, there often is no logical method to ensure that
evidence of diminished culpability is given mitigating effect by the
jury. As the dissenters observed in Johnson, the inquiry into whether
defendant has a dangerous character is incompatible with an inquiry
into his culpability: "A violent and troubled young person may or
may not grow up to be a violent and troubled adult, but what happens
in the future is unrelated to the culpability of the defendant at the
time he committed the crime." '327
Sentencing procedures that focus on culpability, rather than
future dangerousness, would ensure that sentencing determinations
are freed from the undue risk that personal characteristics that
diminish culpability (like youth and mental disability) will be relied
upon by the sentencer to justify a more severe sentence. In addition,
sentencing proceedings that focus on defendant's personal culpability
would be less likely to incorporate stereotyped perceptions that males
and minorities, as well as young people and the mentally ill, are more
dangerous than others into sentencing outcomes.328 Although it may
well be impossible entirely to root- out systematic racial, ethnic,
gender, and disability-based biases under any set of procedures,
where the perceived dangerousness of the defendant's character is not
at issue, such improper considerations would have less room for play.
In short, by refocusing capital sentencing on culpability, and
precluding consideration of evidence of bad character and future
326. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
327. Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 376 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
328. Texas's death penalty statute directs that sentencers are not permitted to consider
race or ethnicity in determining future dangerousness. See TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN.
art. 37.071. That directive, however, does little to reduce the risk that such considerations
will come into play as background and context.
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dangerousness, the risk that persons might be sentenced because they
belong to groups either actually correlated, or perceived as
correlated, with greater rates of criminality would be diminished.
d. Moral, Not Factual, Accuracy
The backward-looking character of the retributive approach to
sentencing has an additional, substantial advantage over the future-
oriented offender-based model. To the extent that "accuracy" is an
important - or even a coherent - value in capital sentencing, a
retributive approach that focuses on the nature and quality of the act
already done is a far firmer foundation on which to assign punishment
than is counter-factual speculation about what the offender might do
in the future, were he released back into society.329
Unlike the question of whether the defendant poses a risk of
future dangerousness, the inquiry into culpability falls squarely within
traditional notions of jury competence. Jurors are regularly called
upon to make judgments, however hard, about the degree to which
particular choices were sufficiently free of apparent external
influences to deserve moral condemnation and blame. These
judgments necessarily are bound up with conventional notions of
responsibility, based on life experience rather than science or
philosophy. But then, capital punishment is supposedly an expression
of the community's shared moral values. Emphasizing culpability
thus plays to the strengths of the jury system. Emphasizing character
plays to its weaknesses.
It is possible to imagine that moral judgments about culpability
might be more or less correct and thus more or less "accurate." It is
much harder to imagine that the jury will be competent at any time
soon to reliably sort dangerous and non-dangerous offenders.33
Empirical evidence suggests that such predictions are wrong more
often than they are right, and the American Psychiatric Association
has disclaimed the validity of such predictions.31
329. Because the sentencing choice before the sentencer typically is between death and
life without parole, the "future dangerousness" inquiry is particularly counterfactual.
After all, regardless of the sentence selected, the offender is highly unlikely ever to reenter
society.
330. To the extent that future dangerousness can be predicted at all, many researchers
believe that actuarial methods are better than clinical methods, and that past violent
conduct is the best predictor of future violent conduct. See, e.g., Gordon C.N. Hall,
Prediction of Sexual Aggression, 10 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 229, 239 (1990).
331. The APA and the Texas Society of Psychiatric Physicians both decertified Dr.
Grigson in 1995. See Gardner v. Johnson, 247 F.3d 551, 556 n.6 (5th Cir. 2001). Dr.
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If the accuracy of the death penalty decision relates to the
question of moral desert, then the information relevant to that
judgment is not informed by behavioral science, but rather is limited
to factors relevant to the culpability of the defendant's conduct and
the harm caused by such culpable conduct. A culpability-centered
sentencing focus would preclude the use of experts to testify
regarding a defendant's predicted future conduct, a development that
alone would substantially enhance the "moral reliability" of
sentencing outcomes. Not only is such testimony untrustworthy as a
matter of science, it is irrelevant to what should be the primary focus
of a retributive sentencing process.
Even if future dangerousness could be predicted with some
accuracy, jury deference to medical or scientific authority in selecting
appropriate sentences would still be troubling. According privileged
status to expert testimony in sentencing is flatly inconsistent with the
idea that the decision to sentence an individual to death is a moral,
rather than a clinical, one. The jury's role requires that the
sentencing decision turn on the individual juror's conception of
proportionate punishment and moral culpability for the injuries the
jury has found defendant responsible. That decision is lodged with
the jury under most capital sentencing schemes precisely because the
jury is thought to best represent the conscience of the community.332
Deference to "professional" diagnoses regarding questions of moral
desert undermines that basic function.333
For all these reasons, culpability must replace character as the
central focus of capital sentencing proceedings.
3. Abandoning the Aggravator/Mitigator Weighing Paradigm
If the focus of the sentencing decision were reoriented to more
explicitly retributive grounds, the procedural mechanism currently
employed in service of the goal of predicting future dangerousness -
Grigson, however, continues to testify in death penalty proceedings to this day. See, e.g.,
Sterling v. Cockrell, No. Civ.A. 3:01-CV-2280, 2003 WL 21488632, at *20 (N.D. Tex., Apr.
23, 2003) (noting that state offered to make Dr. Grigson available as forensic psychiatric
expert).
332. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190 (sentencing juries "maintain a link between
contemporary community values and the penal system"); Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504,
518-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("A jury verdict expresses a collective judgment that we
may fairly presume to reflect the considered view of the community.").
333. Refocusing the sentencing phase of a capital trial by de-emphasizing character in
favor of culpability would have an additional beneficial consequence. It would ensure that
the decision to impose the death penalty is not based on the sentencer's disapproval of life
choices or moral commitments made by the defendant that were lawful, but unpopular.
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the weighing or balancing of aggravators and mitigators - would also
have to be jettisoned for at least three reasons. First, the weighing
paradigm encourages jurors to balance incomparable factors. As a
result, it has failed to ameliorate the deficiencies inherent in the pre-
Furman era of unguided jury discretion, which, despite the elaborate
development of penalty-phase doctrine, continue to persist. Second,
it greatly enhances the chances that a defendant with diminished
culpability will be sentenced to death based on aggravating factors
irrelevant to retributive indicia of gravity. Third, it clothes the death
penalty decision in the false dress of legality and distracts jurors from
the gravity of their task.3"
a. Aggravators and Mitigators are Incomparable
As an analytical matter, the weighing paradigm is fundamentally
incoherent, because aggravators and mitigators are simply not
comparable.335 Some aggravators concern the quantum of harm
caused by the defendant,336 some the defendant's mental state or
motive, and some the attendant circumstances of the crime.33 Some
have no bearing on the crime committed, but rather concern the
offender's past history or record.339 Mitigating factors, in contrast,
relate almost uniformly to the defendant's culpability."'
Notwithstanding their disparate nature, the Supreme Court has
334. In addition, in light of the Court's recent decisions in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S.
584 (2002), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), retributive concerns aside,
the weighing paradigm is now subject to significant constitutional doubt.
335. See, e.g., Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 91, at 120 (noting that weighing
aggravators and mitigators against each other, as the MPC advocates, requires juries to
compare "incommensurable[s]"); Weisberg, supra note 9, at 394 ("[A] rational formula for
comparatively 'weighing' values is impossible, because we cannot devise a mechanical,
verifiable process for 'weighting' the values - that is, assigning them valences in the first
place." (citing ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 294 (Harv. Univ. Press
1981)).
336. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(3)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962)
(defendant also committed another murder).
337. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(3)(g) (Proposed Official Draft 1962)
(listing murder committed for pecuniary gain as an aggravating circumstance).
338. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(3)(e) (Proposed Official Draft 1962)
(listing murder committed in course of dangerous felony as an aggravating circumstance).
339. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(3)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962)
(listing previous convictions for murder or felony involving use or threat of violence as an
aggravating circumstance). And, of course, most jurisdictions also recognize the
defendant's perceived dangerousness as an aggravating factor. See supra discussion
accompanying notes 130-40.
340. See supra discussion accompanying notes 73-74.
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pointedly refused to require states to inform juries how to weigh
diverse aggravating and mitigating facts,"' or what weights should be
ascribed to particular factors."2 Accordingly, most fact-finders are
merely instructed to use their judgment to weigh the relevant factors
as they see fit. 3
It is hardly surprising that the Court has provided so little
guidance: no plausible method for weighing widely diverse kinds of
aggravating and mitigating factors has ever been suggested.' The
predictable result is systemic arbitrariness. After all, where a jury is
told to weigh aggravating and mitigating evidence, with no instruction
as to the weight to be accorded to that evidence, nor even guidance as
to the ultimate values to be vindicated, it can do little more than
make a "gut" call as to whether a defendant should live or die. 35 This
341. See, e.g., Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164,.179 (1988). As one commentator has
explained:
The Supreme Court has stated that states need not provide any specific method
for balancing aggravating and mitigating factors nor give any specific weight to
any of those factors. In effect, sentencers are basically told they may consider
aggravators, they may consider mitigators, but they are given no further
instruction as to how to go about weighing them. If they choose to find that
aggravators outweigh mitigators, by whatever reasoning process, they may
impose a sentence of death.
Conference, supra note 61, at 251.
342. Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 512 (1995).
343. This California court's instruction is typical:
The weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances does not mean a mere
mechanical counting of factors on each side of an imaginary scale, or the arbitrary
assignment of weights to any of them. You are free' to assign whatever moral or
sympathetic value you deem appropriate to each and all of the various factors you are
permitted to consider. In weighing the various circumstances you determine under the'
relevant evidence which penalty is justified and appropriate by considering the totality of
the aggravating circumstances with the totality of the mitigating circumstances.
People v. Griffin, 93 P.3d 344, 381 (2004) (finding no error in instruction).
344. In Baldwin v. Alabama, 472 U.S. 372, 374 (1985), for instance, the defendant was
eighteen years old when he was involved in a sordid assault that culminated in the brutal
murder of a sixteen year old girl. Alabama's death sentencing scheme required the judge
to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors. Id. at 380. But how was the sentencer to
weigh the mitigating fact of defendant's youth against the definitional aggravating
circumstance - the fact that homicide took place during the commission of a robbery, and
the other nonstatutory aggravators it found? Id. The Court did not suggest any practical
approach, and none is readily apparent. Id. at 380-81.
345. For instance, Alabama's statute provides that:
The process.., of weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances to
determine the sentence shall not be defined to mean a mere tallying of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances for the purpose of numerical
comparison. Instead, it shall be defined to mean a process by which
circumstances relevant to sentence are marshaled and considered in an organized
fashion for the purpose of determining whether the proper sentence in view of all
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incoherence is further exacerbated in jurisdictions that allow juries to
consider both statutory and non-statutory aggravators.3"
Because the jury lacks an objective means to weigh or "balance"
aggravators and mitigators against each other, it must rely on its own
intuitions, and different sentencing juries inevitably inevitably apply
different criteria to similar factors. As commentators have observed,
the exercise advocated by the MPC, and adopted as the "paradigm"
of constitutional capital decision-making,
provide[s] no principles by which to make sentencing
judgments, no standards to regulate the decision to kill.
Because the absence of any established weighing process
requires each sentencing authority to devise its own scheme for
deciding whether to impose death, the [MPC approach] actually
increase[s] the dangers of uncontrolled discretion; a different
standard for deciding who shall die is used in every capital
347
case.
The empirical evidence amply confirms that there is no
consistent pattern or hierarchy of harm or culpability that results
from death penalty deliberations.34 Even more disturbing, empirical
evidence continues to demonstrate that the most significant indicators
the relevant circumstances in an individual case is life imprisonment without
parole or death.
ALA. CODE 2004 § 13A-5-48 (2004).
346. The Supreme Court has held that there is no constitutional defect in a death
sentence based at least in part on nonstatutory aggravating circumstances. See Barclay v.
Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 956 (1983). Moreover, the weighing paradigm works serious
mischief on the proper allocation of burdens of persuasion. Although aggravating factors
often must be proved by the State beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court long has
recognized that mitigating factors are not subject to the same proof standards. Cf Jones v.
United States, 527 U.S. 373, 377 (1998) (explaining that the Federal Death Penalty Act of
1994 requires:
More exacting proof of aggravating factors than mitigating ones - although a jury
must unanimously agree that the Government established the existence of an
aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt, section 3593(c), the jury may
consider a mitigating factor in its weighing process so long as one juror finds that
the defendant established its existence by preponderance of the evidence,
sections 3593(c), (d).
18 U.S.C. §§ 3591-93 (West 2000 and West Supp. 2004)). It is quite problematic to require
the jury to keep these burden requirements separate while performing the weighing
calculus demanded of them. The exercise is somewhat akin to asking the jury to "weigh"
its finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant was insane against its
finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the homicidal act was premeditated. The
balancing mechanism fails to provide the sentencer with any useful analytical tool to
resolve the conundrum.
347. Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 91, at 128.
348. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 313, at 519-523 (citing studies that indicate
racial discrimination in the application of the death penalty)..
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of a death sentence are the race of the victim and the race of the
defendant. 9 Despite living under Furman for more than 30 years, it
would appear that the system is little better off, in terms of
eliminating racial discrimination from the administration of the death
penalty, than it was in 1971.350
b. The Weighing Paradigm Discounts Diminished Culpability
The second problem with the weighing paradigm is that it
encourages morally inappropriate "set-offs." In so doing, the
weighing paradigm ensures that less-culpable offenders are frequently
sentenced to death because of distracting factors, prior bad acts,
uncivil character traits, or other marks of "defective" character that
should not offset evidence of reduced culpability.
Most significantly, consideration of the perceived dangerousness
of the defendant's character or his criminal propensities distracts
sentencers from the function they should play in choosing an
appropriate sentence, and thereby undermines the reliability of
sentencing decisions." Given the lack of guidance about how
aggravating and mitigating factors are to be weighed, research
suggests that sentencing decisions often turn on little more than the
number of statutory aggravating factors established: The more
aggravators found, the more likely the defendant will receive a death
sentence, regardless of the number or degree of mitigating factors
presented.352
349. See, e.g., DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY:
A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 149-156 (Northeastern Univ. Press 1990); see also
supra text accompanying notes 311-15 and discussion infra Part IV.B.2.b-c.
350. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 910 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that
a lack of guidance in the weighing process results in unchecked juror discretion once single
aggravating circumstance is found); see also Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Aggravating and
Mitigating Factors: The Paradox of Today's Arbitrary and Mandatory Capital Punishment
Scheme, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 345 (1998) (arguing that the development of
weighing and balancing schemes have failed to impose any real constraints on sentencer
discretion).
351. For example, by asking the jury to weigh, say, evidence that the defendant is less
able than others to control his or her violent impulses against, say, evidence that
defendant's I.Q. just exceeds clinical definitions of mental retardation, the jury has no
basis to arrive at any rational conclusion as to the appropriate sentencing disposition.
However, to the extent that the defendant's low intelligence in fact diminishes his ability
to understand the moral and practical consequences of his conduct, both factors point in
the same direction and indicate that the defendant plainly is less culpable than others.
352. See, e.g., Wiener, supra note 302, at 769 (discussing data showing that "as the
number of aggravating factors grow in number the death penalty is more and more likely
to be imposed regardless of the mitigation considered individually, considered as the total
number of mitigating factors, or considered as the totality of the circumstances") (citing
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Where distractors like dangerousness are "weighed" against
relevant retributive considerations, even the least culpable defendant
risks being sentenced to death.353 However, if the weighing paradigm
were jettisoned, states no longer could rely on aggravators reflecting
aspects of the defendant's character or incidents from his or her past
to outweigh evidence indicating that the defendant was not wholly
culpable for his or her conduct.
c. The Weighing Paradigm Clothes the Death Penalty Decision in the
False Dress of Legality
Third, use of the weighing paradigm bestows upon capital
decision-making a false aura of "legality," and thereby diminishes
each juror's sense of personal moral responsibility. The Court itself
has noted the importance of ensuring that jurors "approach their
sentencing decision with [full] appreciation for the gravity of their
choice and for the moral responsibility reposed in them as
sentencers." '354  However, the mechanistic process of identifying
enumerated aggravators and mitigators all too easily misleads jurors
into thinking that the hard choice has already been made by others."'
And it may, perversely, encourage jurors to select the death penalty
more frequently than if the decision to kill were not clothed in the
finery of legal dress.356
The apparently precise and legalistic framework provided by the
aggravating and mitigating paradigm may provide "a significant
'anxiety-alleviating' effect on capital sentencers," '357 but in so doing it
gives the jury a false sense of disengagement from the core moral
judgment at issue: Did this defendant commit a crime of
the Baldus Nebraska study, supra note 302).
353. Even the MPC's drafters recognized the conflict. See Model Penal Code § 210.3
cmt. 5(b) at 71-72 (Official Draft and Revised Commentaries, Part II 1980) (recognizing
that defense of diminished responsibility "brings formal guilt more closely into line with
moral blameworthiness, but only at the cost of driving a wedge between dangerousness
and social control").
354. California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1011 (1983).
355. As Robert Weisberg has pointed out, the complex legal doctrine surrounding the
death penalty, and particularly the weighing mechanism approved in Gregg, "has
sometimes offered the sentencer the illusion of a legal rule, so that no actor at any point in
the penalty procedure need feel he has chosen to kill any individual." Weisberg, supra
note 9, at 393.
356. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 10, at 433-434 (noting that empirical evidence
suggests that incidence of death penalty increased in Georgia following the post-Gregg
affirmation of Georgia's MPC-based death penalty scheme).
357. Id. at 413.
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extraordinary harmfulness, and if so, was he fully blameworthy for his
conduct?
In sum, the use of the weighing paradigm fails effectively to
structure the decision-making process, provides no real guidance to
juries, and leaves sentencing discretion subject to no greater actual
oversight than in the pre-Furman era of unapologetic unguided
discretion, while encouraging sentencers to take their weighty moral
responsibility less, rather than more, seriously. The weighing
paradigm is not merely inconsistent with, but is antithetical to, basic
retributive principles. The Court could make great strides in
rationalizing the administration of the death penalty by honestly
admitting that the weighing paradigm provides no real restraint or
guidance to death penalty decision-making, and thus under Furman,
is unconstitutional.
4. Circumscribing the Role of Mercy and Vengeance in a Retribution-
Oriented Capital Sentencing Scheme
Finally, in rethinking the penalty phase, we must consider what,
if any, role mercy and vengeance should play in the sentencing
decision.3 Mercy and vengeance can be conceptualized in the
following way. When, based on evidence that elicits sympathy for the
defendant or shows his or her "good" character, a less severe
sentence is imposed on a defendant than others who commit
comparably grave crimes, that sentence is the product of mercy.3"9
When death sentences are imposed based on evidence that stirs
emotions of disgust, hate, or fear, or that shows his or her "bad"
character,3 ° while others committing comparably grave crimes are
358. The debate on both sides is heated. See, e.g., Eric L. Muller, The Virtue of Mercy
in Criminal Sentencing, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 288 (1993) (arguing for greater role for
mercy); MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 283, at 174 (arguing that mercy is an improper
sentencing consideration that detracts from justice).
359. The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of preserving the juries'
discretion to afford mercy. Admissible mitigating facts or circumstances have never been
limited to those which reduce the defendant's culpability, but instead extend to any facts
or circumstances that evoke in the sentencer a willingness to be merciful. Mitigating facts,
thus understood, are facts that have the effect of inducing feelings of sympathy or pity in
the sentencer. See, e.g., California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 562-63 (1987) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
360. More than one commentator has noted the manner in which certain aggravating
factors, just like mitigating factors, play upon the sentencer's emotions. For instance, as
Dan Kahan has argued, the "heinous, vile or depraved" aggravating factor applies
particularly to those aspects of an offense that stir an emotional response in the sentencer
of disgust. Kahan, supra note 291, at 1646. "[C]ourts recognize the role of disgust
sensibilities in revealing to us the most singular acts of wickedness and depravity, the ones
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spared, the sentence is the product of vengeance.36
In a retributive sentencing framework, mercy and vengeance
should be distinguished from mitigation and aggravation. Evidence
that mitigates culpability, or that shows reduced harm, demonstrates
that the offense was comparatively less grave than others, and thus
deserves a less severe punishment. Likewise, aggravating evidence
that demonstrates heightened culpability or harm supports a more
severe sanction. As I have argued here, much of the evidence in
penalty phase proceedings, however, is not relevant to either
determination, but rather concerns the "good" or "bad" character of
the defendant, or seeks to provoke an emotional rather than a
rational response. Although such evidence is relevant to the
competing emotive claims of mercy and vengeance, it appears to be
incompatible with the aims of retributive justice. As Jeffrie Murphy
and Jean Hampton have argued, where just punishment is strictly
proportioned to the desert of the offender, any deviation from that
punishment constitutes, in a sense, an injustice.362
Mercy and vengeance lead to unjust punishment in two ways.
First, they may upset the principle of comparative desert: the jury
may be moved to show mercy to some of the worst offenders while
holding the least bad fully responsible for the harms they cause, and
vice versa with regard to vengeance. Second, to the extent that
anyone "deserves" a sentence of death, both mercy and vengeance
prevent justice from being done. Ironically, to the extent that mercy
is a virtue that derives its value from forgiveness for wrongful, or
sinful, behavior, it may be that the virtue is all the greater when the
act or the actor is that much worse. When a sentence is based on
merciful or vengeful emotions, rather than a rational evaluation of
moral desert, sentencing outcomes are not, at least in theory,
"morally accurate."
From a retributive perspective, an "emotive" construction of the
penalty trial is problematic.363 Penalty phase proceedings that are
we are obliged to strike back against in the most emphatic form of action that our
conventions and laws make available to us. And the power that disgust gives us to discern
and remark such atrocities is indeed insusceptible of being captured by - reduced to - a
precise verbal formula." Id.
361. See Kahan, supra note 291, at 1621.
362. See, e.g., MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 283, at 167 ("If mercy requires a
tempering of justice then there is a sense in which mercy may require a departure from
justice.").
363. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 238, at 355-56 (noting that desert-based
retributive theories are inconsistent with judgments of faults based on emotions: "What
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dominated by a rhetorical battle between the prosecution and
defense, where the prosecution attempts to demonize the defendant
by depicting him as a violent, remorseless monster who will threaten
society unless executed, and the defense seeks to elicit sympathy by
depicting a poor, abused, or disadvantaged individual who succumbed
to some temptation in a moment of weakness, are hardly consistent
with a sentencing model that prizes accuracy and comparatively fair
outcomes.3  After all, the crucial moments in such a proceeding
inevitably are not the product of a rational analysis of the offender's
moral desert, but rather are idiosyncratic, elusive, and dependent on
the skills of the advocates and the prejudices and biases of the jury.
Although the emotive contest model of sentencing is doubtless
far from what Herbert Wechsler envisioned, a penalty phase that
focuses on the defendant's character, rather than his culpability
necessarily gives ample space for these factors to work. But if
character-related considerations not strictly relevant to the offender's
moral desert are not a proper foundation upon which to make
sentencing decisions, what role, if any, is there for mercy and
vengeance?
Even in a capital sentencing regime that prioritizes retributive
values, we probably must permit mercy to play a limited role - if only
because there probably is no other choice - despite the necessary
capriciousness it injects into the process. Although considerations of
comparative and absolute justice should be the central concern of
appropriate penalty phase procedures, any scheme that precluded the
exercise of mercy altogether would seem heartless and alien indeed.
As Justice Blackmun explained, the sentencer's opportunity to
express mercy represents a "distinctive feature of our society that we
deeply value."'3 65 Thus, no matter what procedures are chosen, the
jury must retain discretion to render a sentence less than death
regardless of what factors are balanced, or whether it finds any
substantial mitigating facts. And if the defendant is entitled to ask for
mercy, principles of balance suggest that the state is entitled to argue
matters is choice, and since emotions are unwilled they figure in moral assessment only to
the extent that they displace choice .... ").
364. But see Pillsbury, supra note 203, at 657 (arguing that "the determination of
deserved punishment should be reconceived as a moral-emotive dynamic involving
outrage at the offender's acts of disrespect (moral outrage); [sic] and caring for the
offender's positive moral qualities (empathy)").
365. Callins, v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1151 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (quoting his dissenting opinion in California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538,
563 (1987)).
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that a vengeful response is more appropriate than a merciful one.
66
To preserve the sentencer's right to act mercifully while
protecting less culpable offenders from state-sanctioned vengeance,
mercy and vengeance must be disaggregated from the broader
mitigation and aggravation inquiry. This could be accomplished
simply by allowing the defendant to make an express plea for mercy
once a verdict of guilt has been entered, but prior to sentencing. If
the defendant does not enter such plea, then evidence admissible at
the penalty phase would be limited to whatever is relevant to show
that the defendant acted with full, or diminished, culpability. The
defendant then would be sentenced based solely on retributive
criteria: the harm caused or intended and the culpability attending the
causative acts.
If, on the other hand, the defendant does enter a plea for mercy,
the entire range of character-related evidence now routinely
considered by juries would be opened to both sides to pursue. In such
case, the emotive or rhetorical battle between the prosecution and the
defense could take over. The defendant could attempt to show that,
despite responsibility for the crime, there are aspects of his or her
character that deserve the sympathy and mercy of the jury. At the
same time, the state could introduce evidence to rebut that claim, by
showing that the defendant's character is defective or flawed, that
defendant does pose a danger to society if treated mercifully, and that
his acts deserve a vengeful, not merciful, response. Precisely because
such arguments are based on considerations unrelated to the
defendant's culpability for causing the particular harm in the case at
bar, and because the very concept of "just deserts" inherently protects
each person's entitlement to a sentence not exceeding that which is
proportionate to the gravity of her offense, mercy and vengeance
should only be available to the state where the defendant has signaled
her willingness to move the inquiry to that battleground.
At the same time, because the defendant would be free to
decline to make a plea for mercy, the defendant would have greater
control over the nature of the sentencing proceeding. Evidence of an
aggravating nature that currently routinely goes before juries at the
sentencing phase pertaining to defendant's bad character, prior bad
acts, or future dangerousness would, under such a framework, be
admissible only to rebut the defendant's claim of good character or
366. Other commentators have arrived at the same conclusion. See, e.g., Garvey, supra
note 215, at 1033 (arguing that future dangerousness evidence is only relevant to "resist
the defendant's plea for mercy").
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redeeming qualities that entitle him to a show of mercy. By barring
such evidence in all other cases, the less-culpable defendant is better
protected from execution by a jury enraged to vengeance at the
penalty phase by inflammatory evidence or highly prejudicial expert
testimony.
Conclusion
Herbert Wechsler's project was to impose order on the chaos of
the common criminal law, and he was magnificently successful. The
states and the Supreme Court both relied on Wechsler's work, and
the Model Penal Code, to build the modern capital punishment
edifice. However, the fundamental assumptions underlying
Wechsler's work and the "unrevised" MPC - the embrace of
utilitarianism and rejection of retributivism - are, as the ALI has
acknowledged, no longer widely shared foundations of the criminal
justice system. With respect to capital punishment, these assumptions
have even less currency. Abolition of the death penalty is likely the
only sure way to root out the myriad sources of discrimination and
arbitrariness that currently plague administration of the death
penalty. Short of that, rationalization of sentencing procedures so as
to make them more consistent with the most commonly recognized
justification for keeping the system in place - retributivism - might
help ensure that only those fully culpable for the worst crimes are
subject to its reach.
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